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 The Injustice of Child Poverty 
 In the previous chapter, we sketched a theory of social justice for children 
based within the capability approach. We argued that, as a matter of social 
justice, each and every child is entitled to reach a minimum threshold of 
certain important functionings and capabilities, which are essential to her 
well-being and well-becoming. Furthermore, we have suggested that in the 
case of children, a focus on achieved functionings is often more adequate 
from a social justice perspective than a focus on capabilities. However, this 
assumption has to be understood in relation to the age and competence 
of the child, respecting her agency from an early age on. As children move 
through childhood, as they mature and develop, choice and autonomy 
become more and more important, and social justice reflects this by 
shifting its focus from achieved functionings to capabilities. 
 Our aim in this chapter is to analyze the detrimental effects of child 
poverty on some important functionings (and capabilities for older and 
more competent children). On the one hand, we will use the concept 
of ill-being, which we define as the complete lack of achievement or 
insufficient achievement of at least one functioning that is essential 
to the well-being of children. On the other hand, we will describe the 
injustice of child poverty by referring to ill-becoming, which means that 
child poverty hinders the sufficient achievement of at least one of the 
important capabilities that define adult well-being. This means that we 
have two separate arguments to justify why child poverty is unjust: (a) it 
violates the justified claims of children to well-being and (b) it violates 
the justified claims of children to well-becoming. Even if we claim that 
the injustice of child poverty is proven sufficiently as far as it affects one 
important functioning or capability, we will show that, in fact, child 
poverty is best understood as having multiple and interrelated effects. 
 This chapter explores the ill-being and ill-becoming of child poverty in 
regard to physical and mental health, social inclusion and education. It 
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will show that all these functionings can reasonably be taken for evalu-
ations regarding social justice since they fulfill the criteria necessary for 
such an endeavor, as developed in Chapter 1. With our focus on these 
functionings, we claim neither that they are more important than others 
nor that child poverty affects them alone nor even that child poverty 
affects them primarily. On the contrary, our choice is a pragmatic one, and 
we hope to find broad agreement that these functionings are suitable for 
an examination of the injustices related to child poverty. We do not have a 
definite list; the one we presented and discussed in the previous chapter is 
just a first suggestion and an example of how such a list can be developed; 
since we claim that the injustice of child poverty is sufficiently shown if 
one important functioning cannot be achieved, it is also not necessary 
to provide a fully comprehensive examination of child poverty and its 
effects on all functionings to which children are entitled as a matter of 
justice. Nonetheless health, inclusion and education are all part of the list 
of Biggeri and his colleagues, and they are also included in many other 
lists of functionings and capabilities, for example, the ones of Nussbaum 
and Robeyns, as well as other conceptualizations of well-being of children 
(Amerijckx and Humblet 2014). Furthermore, they are relevant for both 
children and adults. They are not ‘intrinsic goods of childhood’ that would 
be of value only to children, but their particular form and the thresholds 
that should be used differ between children and adults. To be able to read 
and write sufficiently will be a good threshold for a child, but if an adult 
only reaches the same level of education, she will certainly be disadvan-
taged in many other areas of her life. In particular, health and education 
are also good examples for evolving capabilities and fertile functionings, 
and their achievement is essential to a person’s future well-being in terms 
of functionings and capabilities. We will show that health (including 
both a physical and mental dimension), social inclusion and education 
are affected by child poverty in a way that the entitlement of children to 
well-being and well-becoming is violated. We will also show that these 
functionings are entangled and influence each other. For the most part 
our examination will be concerned with the functioning of these four and 
not the capability to be healthy, educated and included. We have argued 
at length why a focus on functionings is necessary in regard to children; 
another reason is the difficulty in measuring them in terms of capabilities. 
The studies we will present are all concerned with functionings and do not 
show if these children, also older ones, lack health, education or inclusion 
because of their own choices. Rather they show us the social determination 
of these functionings, which cannot be captured by referring to choice and 
autonomy, especially not for children and adolescents. 
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 Before we address these claims, we would like to note two things. First, 
our argument is not that each and every child affected by poverty expe-
riences it in the same way and suffers, for example, from ill health due to 
poverty or lacks education because of it. What we do claim instead is that 
in most – nearly all – cases, children living in poverty suffer from nega-
tive effects on at least one functioning they are entitled to as a matter of 
justice, and that this overwhelming majority is enough to justify evalu-
ating it as unjust. We are concerned that children living in poverty suffer 
disadvantages compared with nonpoor children, and for this inequality 
there is no sufficient justification. Children, poor or not poor, cannot 
choose their parents or where they grow up and live, and they cannot 
choose to realize health, education or inclusion or other functionings 
and capabilities without being supported by others. It is also not plaus-
ible to assume that poor parents would prefer their children to suffer 
from these deprivations if they could choose differently. Again, our 
approach claims that well-being and well-becoming can be defined to 
a large extent objectively, with the consequence that we evaluate child 
poverty in a first step regardless of how it is subjectively experienced by 
those children themselves. In a subsequent step, we will come back to 
that issue and show how such subjective evaluations and the articula-
tion of the subjective experiences of child poverty can further expand 
our critique. For the time being, we will focus on what can be said from 
a third-person standpoint using objective measures. 
 Second, we do not make strong claims about causal relations on child 
poverty and its connection to the functionings we explore in detail. We 
rely here on the available evidence brought forward by poverty research 
in other disciplines such as sociology, economics, psychology and medical 
research. For our claim, it is sufficient that poverty plays some substantial 
role in causing these deprivations regardless if other causes are also involved. 
Here, one can also point to the many studies confirming a relationship 
between poverty and child neglect as well as child abuse (Besharov and 
Laumann 1997; Gilbert et al. 2009), which obviously have very bad conse-
quences for the children affected. But also here the causal relationships 
are difficult to grasp, a fact that also poses a challenge to the important 
issue of identifying the most important agents of justice for children in 
poverty, a subject we will address in a later chapter. We do acknowledge 
that from a policy perspective, it is important to untangle these causal 
relations in order to prioritize the effort on those that have the most detri-
mental effects. We are confident that the literature we will discuss here 
points in the direction that child poverty is in fact an important cause for 
the suffering of children in many other dimensions as well. 
70 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
 We are primarily interested in the injustice of child poverty, not in 
exactly how many children are affected by it or how best to count them. 
This implies necessarily that we are not much interested in how many 
children actually suffer the deprivation of one or more important func-
tionings – for example, health – due to their poverty. It is enough for 
our argument that more children in poverty suffer these deprivations 
than their nonpoor peers for the reason that they are poor. Even if just 
a few children live in poverty and hence do not get what they are enti-
tled to as a matter of justice, it is an injustice that deserves criticism and 
needs to be tackled. However, we still hold that it is valuable to take the 
breadth and depth of an injustice into account in order to prioritize it. 
We also acknowledge that it is possible to reach this same conclusion 
from many different perspectives; for example, on the basis of the costs 
that child poverty creates for society, which has been estimated in the 
USA to be as high as 500 billion dollars each year (Holzer et al. 2008). 
 2.1 Concepts and measures of child poverty 
 Before we examine the injustice of child poverty, we must discuss at least 
some aspects of the concept of poverty itself and present some data on 
how many children in welfare states are living in poverty. We do not 
and cannot aim to give a full overview of all the different debates in the 
different disciplines concerned with child poverty, but rather we aim to 
develop a basic understanding of the main aspects of child poverty. Because 
child poverty is mainly an issue of social sciences and not philosophy, we 
will need to focus on what is of significance for the purpose of our book 
and the following questions of social justice. Many questions that arise 
in poverty research are similar to those we discussed in regard to defining 
the functionings and capabilities that should be objects of justice. All 
approaches to child poverty need to define some goods, resources, activ-
ities or capabilities and functionings. They also need to define thresholds 
for these items, and then they need to determine who is counted: the 
individual child or the household. The last point is of particular import-
ance because children usually live with adults and are heavily dependent 
on them (and their resources), and so, attempting to reflect this fact, child 
poverty is often measured on the household level. Moreover, the most 
commonly used indicator for child poverty is still income, and because 
children themselves do not have any relevant income in modern welfare 
states due to their not working, child poverty is measured using the family 
or household income. Before sketching the relevant measures in the USA 
and the European Union (EU) and the concept of social exclusion, we 
wish to outline the concept of poverty in general. 
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 Poverty research has come to agree mostly that poverty has to be 
defined differently and measured according to the welfare and develop-
ment level of the state that is researched. For this reason, the distinction 
between absolute and relative poverty has been often used in order to 
mark that relative poverty reflects things that persons need in a particular 
society (to live a normal or decent live), while absolute poverty refers to 
minimum standards necessary to survive or under which life is at least 
severely impaired (Alcock 2006). This distinction is, indeed, of some use, 
but it is also one of the key features of the capability approach that the 
same amount of basic goods and resources can yield different outcomes 
in different environments and for different persons depending on their 
needs and capacities. This applies to both relative and absolute measures. 
And even if there is some consensus about the goods, activities or capabil-
ities and functionings that should be used to define relative and absolute 
poverty, the question of what thresholds for absolute and relative poverty 
should be set remains unanswered. We will see that in welfare states, 
setting the poverty line at 50 or 60 percent of the equivalent median 
income or understanding material deprivation as the enforced lack of 
two, three or four essential goods is often an arbitrary decision. 
 Another problematic issue in all poverty research in modern welfare 
states is whether thresholds are based on the median income or on 
deprivation measures defined according to what is seen as normal in 
a society: one criticism is that poverty is mixed with (mere) inequality 
and so thresholds are not able to capture poverty’s essence. For example, 
Amartya Sen has criticized Peter Townsend, stating that, according to his 
relative measure, in a society where everyone has two Cadillacs, those 
able to afford but one Cadillac would be counted as poor (Sen 1983). 
Sen considers this a dissolving of the concept of poverty, which should 
be kept to cover those cases where people are really suffering from the 
deprivation of basic goods or capabilities and functionings that can and 
need to be defined in an absolute way. We agree with Ruth Lister that 
much of the debate between Sen and Townsend was not fruitful, but 
its core is still a challenge for poverty research in welfare states and, 
indeed, any philosophical examination of poverty in rich and highly 
developed contexts (Lister 2004, ch. 1). Sen’s criticism has some merit 
and, if approved, would lead to acknowledging that child poverty in 
such an absolute sense is fortunately a rare thing in modern welfare 
states. Most children have at least some basic form of shelter, access to 
health care and nutrition and are protected from hunger. Opinions that 
relativize poverty as not being ‘real’ poverty are also not uncommon in 
the public and among poor people themselves (Beresford et al. 1999). 
Our answer to this challenge is twofold but in no way new. 
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 On the one hand, we stress that every definition of poverty is always 
dependent on a normative background theory about what is needed for a 
decent or minimum life, something we will never be able to capture from 
empirical research alone. It is obvious that all human beings have certain 
biological needs, but it is also obvious that these alone are not enough 
to determine poverty (in fact, the concept of poverty would more or less 
coincide with the concept of health as it is often understood). One is able 
to survive for a long time in pain and hunger and without shelter or any 
social relations; should we claim that such a life is not deemed a life in 
poverty, it would say a lot about the moral status of our world. As we said, 
relative measures are not simply arbitrary and not solely interested in 
inequality, either; they are based on some kind of reasoning about what 
is a decent or ‘normal’ life in a particular society or state. On the other 
hand, it is not an either-or situation. To care about relative poverty does 
not imply that one should not care about absolute poverty and vice versa. 
An interest in absolute poverty does not make relative poverty less severe 
for those who suffer from it, even if we do know that many more severe 
forms of poverty exist in this world. We do acknowledge that there are 
questions of priority, which are also relevant for global justice and policy 
decisions, but this does not mean that we should not care about relative 
poverty and that it is not necessary to research what kinds of hardship 
and poverty exist in affluent societies and modern welfare states. 
 With these thoughts in mind, we will now discuss the official poverty 
measures in the USA and in the European Union. We will see that the issues 
of definition, determining indicators and setting thresholds are present 
and that no measure is and maybe never will be perfect and able to provide 
us with all the information about the breadth and depth of poverty. 
 The poverty thresholds used by the US Census Bureau are money 
income thresholds based on the minimal cost of food needs and adjusted 
for family size and age (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 2014). It uses income 
before taxes; capital gains and noncash benefits (such as public housing, 
Medicaid and food stamps) are not included. The poverty thresholds were 
developed in 1963 and 1964 by Mollie Orshansky, using US Department 
of Agriculture food budgets designed for families under economic stress 
and data about what portion of a family’s income was spent on food 
(Fisher 2002). The thresholds are annually modified using the consumer 
price index, but they do not reflect the level of welfare or income in the 
USA. In that sense, the official poverty line in the USA is absolute. The 
relevant annual thresholds in 2013 were $11,888 for a single person and 
$16,057 for a household with one adult under sixty-five and one related 
child under eighteen (see Table 2.1 for all the thresholds for 2013). There 
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by counting how many children live in poor households. The poverty 
thresholds do not account for the differences in housing and living costs 
between areas but are applied nationally. That is of importance because, 
with the exact same amount of money, a family in a cheaper area can 
be much better off than a family with more income but living in a more 
expensive area. 
 Based on this calculation, there were about 45.3 million poor people 
in the USA in 2013 – about 14.5 percent of the population. This is one 
of the highest numbers in the fifty years that poverty has been measured 
in the USA, although the situation stabilized after sharp increases in the 
years 2007 to 2011, and the poverty rate went down in 2013 for the first 
time since 2006. Young people and children are more affected by poverty 
(for details, see Table 2.2); the poverty rate for children under eighteen was 
19.9 percent (or 14.7 million children), while the poverty rate for people 
aged between eighteen and sixty-four was 13.6 percent and for persons older 
than sixty-five it was 9.5 percent. The poverty rate for children younger 
than six years old is even higher, reaching 22.2 percent (down from 25.3% 
in 2010), which accounts for 5.2 million young children living in poverty 
(Table 2.3). People living in institutional group quarters (such as prisons 
and nursing homes), college dormitories and military barracks and those 
without conventional housing (who are not in shelters) are not included 
in these numbers. Neither are unrelated children under the age of fifteen 
included, which means that children in foster care are not surveyed. 
 The European Union uses two different measures for poverty in 
general that also apply to children (Atkinson and Marlier 2010). On the 
one hand, it employs a relative at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is 
set at 60 percent of the equivalent median income in a country. This 
threshold is relative and changes according to the average income. As 
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a result, the poverty threshold for a single person living in Austria, for 
instance, has increased over the years from an annual income of €10,200 
in 2005 to €12,791 in 2011; for a household with two adults and two 
children under fourteen, the poverty threshold was an annual income 
of €22,681 in 2005 and €26,861 in 2011. In Greece, on the other hand, 
where the average income has decreased due to the economic crisis, the 
poverty line has decreased from an annual income of €7,178 in 2010 to 
€5,708 in 2012. If a household disposes of less income than that, all of its 
members are described as ‘at risk of poverty’. These poverty thresholds 
are also relative in another sense; since they are national poverty thresh-
olds benchmarked against the median income in a specific country, 
the at-risk-of-poverty thresholds are very different in each member 
state of the European Union. Just to give a few examples, for 2011 the 
at-risk-of poverty threshold was as high as €12,186 annual income in 
the Netherlands, while in Greece it was €6,591, in Bulgaria only €1,749 
and in Slovakia €3,784. This means that a person with €10,000 annual 
income living in Vienna (Austria) is counted as being at risk of poverty, 
but if this person moves a hundred kilometers to live in Slovakia, she is 
no longer counted as poor unless her disposable income has changed. 
Using such national poverty thresholds obviously has certain advan-
tages, because they are sensitive to the different income levels and to 
that extent also reflect differences in the living costs in the member 
states of the European Union. These different poverty thresholds also 
show the existing inequality in these dimensions. 
 On the other hand, the EU also measures poverty as material depriv-
ation by referring to a list of goods and services that are deemed essential. 
The background idea for such a list was developed by Peter Townsend, 
who argued that poverty is an issue of being unable to do and have what 
is normal or standard in a society (Townsend 1979). He claimed, however, 
that poverty is always context-sensitive: there is no useful measure that 
applies to all contexts. Still, he also insisted that poverty is not only about 
survival and basic goods or capabilities and functionings but also about 
doing and having what a given society considers standard. Although 
Townsend asserted that he wanted to separate poverty and inequality, 
he ended up, as can be seen, connecting them more closely. As we will 
discuss, material deprivation is also close to concepts of social exclusion, 
whose wider focus tries to capture the important dimensions of what it 
means to be part of a particular society (Nolan and Whelan 2010). 
 Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to 
be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the type of 
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diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and 
amenities which are customary, or are at least widely encouraged or 
approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are 
so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or 
family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, 
customs and activities. (Townsend 1979, 31) 
 The current list of goods and services used to measure material depriv-
ation in the EU is as follows: a household cannot afford to (1) pay its 
rent or utility bills, (2) keep its home adequately warm, (3) face unex-
pected expenses, (4) eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second 
day, (5) enjoy a week’s holiday away from home once a year, (6) have 
a car, (7) have a washing machine, (8) have a color TV, (9) have a tele-
phone. A person is counted as being materially deprived if she lives in 
a household that, for financial reasons, cannot afford at least three of 
these nine items; a person who cannot afford four or more of the items 
is considered severely materially deprived. 
 Two things are important in order to understand the concept of material 
deprivation: the items on the list are determined by asking the popula-
tion whether they are, indeed, perceived as really necessary possessions 
(and using some statistics to validate them). The background idea is that 
every item should (a) reflect the lack of an ordinary or minimal living 
pattern common to a majority or large part of the population in the 
EU and most of its member states; (b) allow international comparisons 
(i.e., convey the same information value in the various countries and not 
relate specifically to a “national” context); (c) allow comparisons over 
time; and (d) be responsive to changes in the living standard of people 
(Fusco, Guio and Marlier 2013). These items are thus also context-sensi-
tive and relative and can and do change over time. Access to the Internet 
and having a PC are items that can be expected to be on that list soon. 
One of the proposals for a new material-deprivation measure is to have 
thirteen items on the list: five ‘personal’ items (things the person cannot 
afford but would like to have) and eight ‘household’ items (things the 
household cannot afford) (Guio, Gordon and Marlier 2012). Not being 
able to afford four of these renders one materially deprived. The five 
personal items are being able to replace worn-out clothes with new (not 
secondhand) ones; owning two pairs of properly fitting shoes, including 
a pair of all-weather shoes; being able to spend a small amount of money 
each week on oneself without having to consult anyone; having regular 
leisure activities and getting together with friends or family for a drink 
or meal at least once a month. The eight household items are replacing 
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worn-out furniture; having a meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian 
equivalent every second day; meeting unexpected expenses; taking a one-
week annual holiday away from home; avoiding arrears (mortgage or 
rent, utility bills, hire purchase / installment plan commitments); having 
a computer with an Internet connection; keeping the home adequately 
warm and having a car or van for private use. 
 The items on this list are not the result of any normative reasoning like, 
for example, the items on Nussbaum’s list, and they do not aim to reflect 
things people are or should be entitled to as a matter of social rights in 
the EU or its member states. Hence, this list also does not converge with 
any right to have items that would trigger any obligation on the side 
of the state, although it can be used to guide social policies. A second 
important thing to consider is that this list of items is the same for all 
member states of the EU and is therefore absolute in contrast to the 
at-risk-of-poverty lines, which are determined using national standards. 
So the monetary poverty line and the measure of material deprivation 
provide researchers and policy makers with different kinds of informa-
tion. A look at the respective statistics makes that point clear: while in 
2011 the monetary poverty rate was between 9.8 percent in the Czech 
Republic and 22.2 percent in Bulgaria, the rates of material deprivation 
differ much more. In Bulgaria, the country with the highest rate of 
materially deprived people in the EU, the rate was 60.1 percent in 2011, 
while in Sweden, the country with the lowest rate, it was 4.2 percent (for 
more details, see Table 2.4). It is also possible, as is done, for example, 
in the national statistics in Austria, to combine both measures and to 
differentiate four groups: those who are neither at risk of poverty nor 
materially deprived, those who fit onto either one category or the other 
and, the last and most disadvantaged group of people, those who live in 
households that are both at risk of poverty and materially deprived. The 
official statistics in Austria call the last group of people ‘manifest poor’. 
 In the European Union, official statistics measure child poverty by 
counting the children in households that are at risk of poverty or materi-
ally deprived as well. The at-risk-of-poverty rate is higher for children 
under eighteen than for the age group between eighteen and sixty-four 
(see Table 2.5). In 2011, 19.3 percent of the children (6.3 million children) 
under six years were living in at-risk-of-poverty households compared 
with 16 percent of persons between 18 and 64 (51 million persons). It is 
worth noting that the numbers differ significantly between the member 
states of the EU, and even rich countries have high numbers of child 
poverty; for example, Germany (15.6% of children under six at risk-of-
poverty) and Sweden (15.7% of children under six at risk of poverty). 
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20 16.4 17.5 16.5 18.4 16.9
New member 
states (12)




13.8 15.3 13.9 16.1 15.4 16.9
Belgium 13.3 14.8 11.6 14.7 12.9 15.3
Bulgaria : 14 55 21.4 60.1 22.2
Czech 
Republic
22.7 10.4 16.2 9 16.1 9.8
Denmark 7.6 11.8 5.4 11.8 6.9 13
Germany 11 12.2 13 15.2 12.4 15.8
Estonia 26.6 18.3 12.4 19.5 21.5 17.5
Ireland 11.2 19.7 13.6 15.5 22.7 15.2
Greece 26.3 19.6 21.8 20.1 28.4 21.4
Spain 11.9 20.1 10.8 20.8 13.2 22.2
France 13.2 13 13.1 12.5 12.4 14
Italy 14.3 18.9 16.1 18.7 22.3 19.6
Cyprus 31.2 16.1 24.9 15.9 29.8 14.8
Latvia 56.8 19.4 35.7 25.9 49 19
Lithuania 51.7 20.5 22.2 20 35.1 19.2
Luxembourg 3.9 13.7 3.5 13.4 4.7 13.6
Hungary 39.7 13.5 37.1 12.4 42.2 13.8
Malta 15.2 14.3 13.7 15.3 17.1 15.6
Netherlands 7.5 10.7 5.2 10.5 6.6 11
Austria 8.3 12.3 13.7 12.4 9.5 12.6
Poland 50.8 20.5 32.3 16.9 26.4 17.7
Portugal 21.2 19.4 23 18.5 20.9 18
Romania : : 50.3 23.4 47.7 22.2
Slovenia 14.7 12.2 16.9 12.3 17.2 13.6
Slovakia 42.6 13.3 27.8 10.9 22 13
Finland 10.8 11.7 9.1 13.6 8.4 13.7
Sweden 5.7 9.5 4.6 12.2 4.2 14
United 
Kingdom
12.5 19 11.3 18.7 13.3 16.2
 Source: Eurostat, www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ 
The measure of material deprivation (and severe material deprivation) 
is also interesting in this regard. In total, more than 3 million children 
under the age of six were living in severely deprived households in the 
EU in 2011, as were nearly 9.5 million children under eighteen and more 
than 28 million persons between the age of eighteen and  sixty-four 
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Geo/time 2005 2008 2011
EU (27 
countries)
19.1 20.0 14.7 19.0 20.4 14.7 19.3 20.8 16.0
New member 
states (12)
25.4 26.4 17.6 20.1 23.1 15.4 20.7 24.0 16.5
Belgium 20.2 18.1 12.0 17.1 17.2 12.2 21.7 18.7 12.9
Bulgaria : 18 12 26.1 25.5 17.0 27.7 28.4 18.2
Czech 
Republic
17.6 17.6 9.4 11.3 13.2 8.3 12.5 15.2 9.1
Denmark 13.5 10.4 11.0 9.3 9.1 11.3 8.5 10.2 13.1
Germany 11.1 12.2 11.9 15.1 15.2 15.4 15.6 15.6 16.4
Estonia 23.3 21.3 16.8 13.0 17.1 15.0 14.7 19.5 18.0
Ireland 17.8 23.0 16.0 14.4 18.0 13.4 13.9 17.1 15.1
Greece 18.8 20.4 17.1 21.5 23.0 18.7 21.3 23.7 20.0
Spain 22.1 26.0 16.4 25.1 28.2 17.3 25.1 29.5 20.8
France 14.3 14.4 11.6 15.0 15.6 11.6 18.0 18.8 13.5
Italy 21.7 23.6 16.4 23.0 24.7 16.3 24.5 26.3 18.5
Cyprus 13.5 12.8 11.1 14.1 14.0 10.8 13.0 12.8 11.5
Latvia 19.6 22.0 18.2 21.5 23.6 19.4 20.4 24.7 20.2
Lithuania 24.1 27.2 19.0 19.3 22.8 16.8 18.5 25.2 20.2
Luxembourg 21.5 20.2 12.8 20.3 19.8 12.9 20.8 20.3 13.1
Hungary 19.6 19.9 13.2 19.5 19.7 12.0 21.2 23.0 13.6
Malta 14.5 17.6 11.4 18.3 20.4 12.0 18.6 23.0 13.1
Netherlands 14.4 15.3 10.2 12.7 12.9 9.9 14.7 15.5 10.5
Austria 14.7 14.9 11.1 14.5 14.9 10.9 15.9 15.4 11.0
Poland 27.5 29.3 20.4 19.6 22.4 16.3 19.7 22.0 17.1
Portugal 20.4 23.7 15.9 16.3 22.8 16.3 18.7 22.4 16.2
Romania : : : 26.3 32.9 20.0 28.2 32.9 21.0
Slovenia 11.5 12.1 10.4 10.4 11.6 10.5 14.7 14.7 11.7
Slovakia 15.7 18.9 12.7 17.8 16.7 9.5 21.1 21.2 12.4
Finland 11.9 10.0 10.5 13.3 12.0 11.8 13.3 11.8 12.8
Sweden 9.8 10.2 9.1 13.4 12.9 11.2 15.7 14.5 12.5
United 
Kingdom
25.3 22.9 16.2 24.0 24.0 14.7 18.1 18.0 14.1
 Source: Eurostat, www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ 
(see Table 2.6). While Denmark has very low rates (1.9% of children 
under six), other countries such as Bulgaria and Romania have rates of 
severe material deprivation of children as high as 40 percent. It cannot 
be said, though, that material deprivation of children is nonexistent in 
many rich countries of the EU: in Germany, more than 700,000 children 
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Geo/time 2005 2008 2011
EU (27 
countries)
3,379 11,668 32,500 2,926 9,404 26,341 3,122 9,470 28,113
New member 
states (12)
1,814 6,800 19,941 1,230 4,348 12,968 1,195 4,025 12,384
Belgium 70 197 419 50 165 377 73 187 382
Bulgaria : : : 159 521 1,823 171 584 1,977
Czech 
Republic
65 293 744 41 156 447 48 149 405
Denmark 17 46 122 12 30 69 7 39 97
Germany 169 783 2,565 334 955 3,147 249 737 3,066
Estonia 9 35 98 4 13 38 5 22 80
Ireland 33 94 110 28 78 156 36 117 218
Greece 66 195 795 60 200 720 106 322 1,072
Spain 148 439 1,098 168 446 1,040 135 434 1,459
France 256 812 1,972 318 859 2,065 362 929 1,984
Italy 274 779 2,372 328 985 2,712 424 1,299 4,141
Cyprus 6 22 57 5 17 43 7 26 65
Latvia 39 163 529 22 76 231 37 116 410
Lithuania 63 245 661 31 83 244 23 96 346
Luxembourg 1 3 5 0 1 2 0 1 5
Hungary 150 536 1,434 145 417 1,145 157 536 1,501
Malta 2 6 13 1 5 11 2 6 18
Netherlands 48 126 250 25 82 161 27 104 293
Austria 18 58 162 44 118 346 33 86 210
Poland 692 2,709 8,216 341 1,305 4,317 310 934 3,165
Portugal 74 200 539 45 234 607 65 222 511
Romania : : : 446 1,613 4,180 398 1,426 3,944
Slovenia 3 15 65 4 19 90 6 20 82
Slovakia 65 261 768 31 122 399 30 110 389
Finland 11 42 132 11 34 121 10 35 116
Sweden 14 72 125 12 38 83 8 28 74
United 
Kingdom
367 1,022 1,892 259 831 1,767 390 906 2,099
 Source: Eurostat, www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ 
under the age of eighteen are severely deprived; in France, more than 
900,000. The numbers and rates for ‘normal’ material deprivation are 
even higher. 
 Besides measuring child poverty with the indicators used for the whole 
population, the EU has also started to develop child-specific measures, 
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adapting the material-deprivation index, and to define specific goods 
and services for children (Guio, Gordon and Marlier 2012). A final list 
of eighteen items was developed, composed of thirteen children’s items 
(also collected on the household level) and five household items. The 
children’s items are (1) some new (not secondhand) clothes; (2) two 
pairs of properly fitting shoes, including a pair of all-weather shoes; (3) 
fresh fruits and vegetables daily; (4) one meal with meat, chicken, fish or 
vegetarian equivalent daily; (5) books at home suitable for the children’s 
age; (6) outdoor leisure equipment; (7) indoor games; (8) a suitable place 
to do homework; (9) regular leisure activities (sports, youth organiza-
tions, etc.); (10) celebrations on special occasions; (11) possibility of 
inviting friends around to play and eat from time to time; (12) partici-
pation in school trips and school events that cost money; (13) one-week 
annual holiday away from home. The household items are (14) replace-
ment of worn-out furniture; (15) avoidance of arrears (mortgage or rent, 
utility bills, hire purchase / installment commitments); (16) a computer 
and an Internet connection (enforced lack; i.e., cannot afford but would 
like to have); (17) keeping the home adequately warm (enforced lack); 
(18) a car or van for private use (enforced lack). The EU does not use this 
list to actually measure child poverty, but it might do so in the future as 
the pressure to gather knowledge about child poverty rises. 
 A different approach is used by UNICEF, which also developed meas-
ures for children’s well-being in rich countries (UNICEF IRC 2013, 2012). 
UNICEF distinguishes the following six dimensions: material well-
being, health and safety, educational well-being, family and peer rela-
tionships, risky behaviors and subjective well-being. The indicators 
for material well-being were very close to the poverty measures used 
by the EU and reflected both income poverty and material deprivation. 
Income poverty was captured by the relative child poverty rate (percent 
of children living in households with equivalent incomes below 50% of 
national median) and the child poverty gap (distance between national 
poverty line and median incomes of households below poverty line); 
material deprivation was captured by using an index of child depriv-
ation (percent of children lacking specific items) and a family affluence 
scale (percent of children reporting low family affluence). The use of 
both income poverty and material deprivation is based on the insight 
that being income poor does not necessarily say much about the actual 
living conditions of a child because other factors are also relevant. The 
index of child deprivation used fourteen items, a child being deemed 
to be deprived if she lacks at least two of them: (1) three meals a day; 
(2) at least one meal a day with meat, chicken or fish (or vegetarian 
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equivalent); (3) fresh fruit and vegetables every day; (4) books suitable 
for the child’s age and knowledge level (not including schoolbooks); (5) 
outdoor leisure equipment (bicycle, roller skates, etc.); (6) regular leisure 
activities (swimming, playing an instrument, participating in youth 
organizations, etc.); (7) indoor games (at least one per child, including 
educational baby toys, building blocks, board games, computer games); 
(8) money to participate in school trips and events; (9) a quiet place 
with enough room and light to do homework; (10) an Internet connec-
tion; (11) some new clothes (i.e., not all secondhand); (12) two pairs 
of properly fitting shoes; (13) the opportunity, from time to time, to 
invite friends home to play and eat; (14) the opportunity to celebrate 
special occasions such as birthdays, name days, religious events, and the 
like. The second component of material deprivation was the affluent 
family scale, which was measured by the responses to four questions the 
children were asked: (1) Does your family own a car, van or truck? (2) 
During the past twelve months, how many times did you travel away 
on holiday with your family? (3) How many computers does your family 
own? (4) Do you have your own bedroom? The results for the children’s 
material well-being dimension reveal that the eastern European coun-
tries show the highest rates of both components of material deprivation, 
while the Scandinavian countries fare much better (for more details, see 
Table 2.7). The USA, Germany and Canada are found in the middle. 
Besides calculating the rankings of OECD countries with significant 
information in each dimension, UNICEF also calculated an overall score 
for each country that was not an aggregate of indicator scores per se. 
Rather, the overall score was an average of how each country ranked 
across all six dimensions. One interesting and maybe surprising result 
was that the USA was in the fourth last overall place and only Lithuania, 
Latvia and Romania had a worse overall score. The low ranking of the 
USA was also due to its having the second highest child poverty rate. 
 Besides these large-scale surveys, there are uncountable smaller studies 
that use different approaches, methods and indicators we cannot 
present here. It is important to note, though, that there is a growing 
consensus about the fact that child poverty is a multidimensional 
phenomenon that cannot be adequately captured by a single measure 
alone or smaller studies, as the EU and UNICEF also acknowledge. This 
leads to the extended lists that combine monetary thresholds with 
deprivation indicators. While this is certainly progress, some researchers 
call for even more multidimensionality and demand the inclusion of 
health, education and emotional well-being (Minujin et al. 2006). We 
already mentioned that more differentiation regarding the dimension 
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1 Netherlands 2.4 1 5 1 1 4
2 Norway 4.6 3 7 6 4 3
3 Iceland 5 4 1 10 3 7
4 Finland 5.4 2 3 4 12 6
5 Sweden 6.2 5 2 11 5 8
6 Germany 9 11 12 3 6 13
7 Luxembourg 9.2 6 4 22 9 5
8 Switzerland 9.6 9 11 16 11 1
9 Belgium 11.2 13 13 2 14 14
10 Ireland 11.6 17 15 17 7 2
11 Denmark 11.8 12 23 7 2 15
12 Slovenia 12 8 6 5 21 20
13 France 12.8 10 10 15 13 16
14 Czech Republic 15.2 16 8 12 22 18
15 Portugal 15.6 21 14 18 8 17
16 United Kingdom 15.8 14 16 24 15 10
17 Canada 16.6 15 27 14 16 11
18 Austria 17 7 26 23 17 12
19 Spain 17.6 24 9 26 20 9
20 Hungary 18.4 18 20 8 24 22
21 Poland 18.8 22 18 9 19 26
22 Italy 19.2 23 17 25 10 21
23 Estonia 20.8 19 22 13 26 24
23 Slovakia 20.8 25 21 21 18 19
25 Greece 23.4 20 19 28 25 25
26 USA 25.8 26 25 27 23 23
27 Lithuania 25.2 27 24 19 29 27
28 Latvia 26.4 28 28 20 28 28
29 Romania 28.6 29 29 29 27 29
 Source: UNICEF Office of Research (2013). ‘Child Well-Being in Rich Countries: A Comparative 
Overview’, Innocenti Report Card 11, UNICEF Office of Research, Florence. 
of space is needed. Calculations of relative income poverty will come 
to different results in different regions; housing costs, for example, are 
usually higher in urban regions, and even within them, at the neigh-
borhood level vast differences can exist. Another issue is the level of 
application of deprivation measures like the ones discussed. The know-
ledge one can extract for the EU is that deprivation is much higher in 
eastern member states than, say, in Germany and Austria, but what the 
data we presented does not show is that within these two countries, 
one can easily find significant differences between regions and neigh-
borhood. It is not a surprise that there are many regions in Germany 
where material deprivation among children is nearly nonexistent, while 
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in other regions it is a more prevalent issue. Besides space, the dimen-
sion of time needs to be acknowledged; how long a person is poor and 
during which phase in the life course, for example, during childhood, 
and whether poverty is a returning issue is highly relevant information. 
The dynamics of poverty are crucial and underexplored, which can also 
be attributed to the lack of data (Addison, Hulme and Kanbur 2009). 
Time is also relevant in the sense that it is valuable information to know 
if certain phases of life are particularly prone to poverty, as is the case for 
childhood. It is puzzling that members of society regularly deemed as in 
need and worthy of particular protection and support, called by politi-
cians ‘the future of a society’, are more often living in poverty. 
 Before examining the injustice of child poverty, we need to point out 
two further aspects in relation to the aims and scope of this chapter. Firstly, 
we will focus on child poverty and studies that examine it in welfare 
states such as the countries of the European Union, the USA and, in some 
cases, Canada and Australia. We will, however, exclude the poorer states 
of the EU, such as Bulgaria and Romania, from our examination. The 
main reason is that, although such countries are members of the EU and 
certainly higher developed than many other countries in this world, they 
are still not on par with the richer states in the EU or the USA. The data 
we presented before on the breadth and depth of child poverty in these 
countries shows that sufficiently. Evidence shows that in highly devel-
oped countries severe forms of child poverty also exist but fortunately 
on a smaller scale (Weinreb et al. 2002). Secondly, despite this focus, we 
are confident that our conclusions are applicable to many more coun-
tries and contexts of child poverty. It holds generally that child poverty 
negatively affects the functionings children can achieve and the capabil-
ities they can develop during childhood and in later life. This is in no 
way a problem exclusive to rich countries; in fact, evidence convincingly 
suggests that the problems are even greater and more severe in poorer 
countries in Europe and, indeed, everywhere else in the world. Still, child 
poverty in Romania and Bulgaria is less severe and widespread than it is in 
many African or Asian countries. It should be kept in mind that, using the 
monetary measure alone, the poor in richer states would be the middle 
class in others and among the affluent in many more. 
 2.2 The Ill-Being and Ill-Becoming of child poverty: 
physical and mental health 
 We have presented five criteria a functioning needs to fulfill in order to 
count as one children are entitled to it as a matter of justice: (a) it must 
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reflect a truly important dimension of children’s well-being or well-be-
coming (which means that it is important for the achievement of one 
or more other important capabilities as an adult); (b) its choice must be 
based on the best available (empirical) knowledge about children’s lives 
and development; (c) the functioning can be distributed in a meaningful 
way and can therefore be secured by the institutional design of a society; 
(d) it must be objectively determinable and not merely subjective; and 
(e) it must also take into account children’s own views. 
 We have also offered a sixth criterion that allows the selection of func-
tionings of particular importance because they are fertile and have positive 
effects on the development and achievement of other functionings and 
capabilities. For most of these criteria, there is only little dispute if they 
support physical and mental health, which is certainly an important part 
of children’s well-being and well-becoming. The central role that health 
plays is based on broad scientific knowledge. Furthermore, children them-
selves value their own health, although this is dependent on a certain 
level of maturity and competence. Health, at least many aspects of it, is 
objectively measurable, both physical and mental health. The claim that 
health, perhaps especially mental health, is something that can be secured 
for everyone on the basis of the institutional design of a society is, on 
the other hand, more problematic. Health is surely influenced by other 
factors as well, such as genes and the natural environment, which are to a 
lesser extent alterable; likewise, temporary phases of ill health are a normal 
aspect of life. There will always be ill health, early death and suffering 
that cannot be prevented; the argument here is not that health is totally 
controllable, like, say, the distribution of a specific toy, but that it is, to a 
sufficient extent, socially determined (Marmot and Wilkinson 2003). 
 Different pathways for this social determination have been discussed, 
and a recent review stressed the connection between education and 
health, working conditions and health, neighborhood conditions and 
health, income and wealth and health, and race and health (Braveman, 
Egerter and Williams 2011). All of these influence health to a great 
extent and are the subject of public concern, especially as they are alter-
able. Evidence now points in the direction that child poverty is one 
of the social factors that severely influences health. Thus, even if, on 
the individual level, there are many cases in which society cannot do 
much to secure health for children or secure that they become healthy 
adults, the influence of social factors on health is still large enough to 
claim that they should be changed accordingly and that ill health due 
to unnecessary factors is unjust. Again, for older children we have to 
add that they can – at least to some extent – choose not to be healthy 
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or risk their health because they prefer to realize other options, such 
as smoking or engaging in risky sports. It seems also clear that health 
counts as valuable for the current well-being during childhood as well 
as the well-being as an adult. It is therefore not a child-specific function 
in the sense that adults are not entitled to it as a matter of justice – at 
least in the form of having the real freedom to be healthy. In any case, 
concerning younger children, it is clear that they should actually be 
healthy and that giving them the choice to decide for themselves is not 
a realistic and morally permissible option here. 
 Moreover, health is a fertile functioning and ill health, a corrosive 
disadvantage. Some reasons for this claim are closely connected to the 
research about the relation between poverty and health, which we will 
discuss later, but in general it is reasonable to view health as fertile 
because it influences nearly all other functionings and capabilities chil-
dren can reach. Sridhar Venkatapuram has offered a view of health from 
a capability perspective that is best understood as the ability to achieve 
valuable functionings and capabilities (Venkatapuram 2013, 2011). 
Health functions here as a kind of supercapability from which all other 
capabilities and functionings are more or less dependent. Viewed from 
the perspective of ill health, this claim can be interpreted as follows: in 
the most severe form of ill health, which leads to death, it is obvious 
that no other functionings or capabilities can be achieved and that it 
is corrosive in an absolute sense. However, we do not want or need to 
defend such a strong claim here; indeed we are fine with the notion of 
health as an important and fertile functioning that positively influences 
the achievement of other functionings and capabilities both during 
childhood and adulthood. For example, studies have shown that health 
in childhood influences the socioeconomic status in later life (Palloni 
2006). WHO, too, endorses such an understanding in its definition of 
health as a resource for everyday life (Williamson and Carr 2009), and 
it should be obvious that the health status of a child profoundly influ-
ences central aspects of her life, such as going to school and learning and 
playing and meeting friends. The lack of health per se is not automatic-
ally a violation of social justice, but if it is the result of preventable and 
changeable social causes, this aspect becomes effective. At this point we 
make the connection between child poverty, health and social justice. 
 Health is also corrosive in the sense that it affects the family members, 
especially the close caregivers of the child who is not healthy. We cannot 
explore this aspect in any detail, but we would like to at least mention 
that being healthy or being ill goes beyond the individual person in such 
a condition. Especially forms of chronic ill health as well as disabilities 
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demand much from caregivers, even preventing them from achieving 
some important functionings and capabilities themselves. The intersec-
tion between poverty and health is also clear here: if a family or parents 
do not have the resources to pay for professional help and care, they 
are dependent on the state and a health care system to support them. 
Otherwise, the chronic illness of a child can easily become a corrosive 
disadvantage for the parents and other family members. 
 Two more things have to be added here. The first one is related to 
defining health. We do not have a comprehensive definition, being 
aware of the difficulties to define health and its counterpart ill health or 
disease; debates in the literature do not yield, as far as we can see, to one 
unanimous conclusion (Venkatapuram 2013; Ereshefsky 2009). We are, 
however, convinced that we do not need such a definition for our argu-
ment. We will present studies that show how child poverty affects various 
indicators of health in terms of diseases and maladies that children are 
more likely to suffer from if they are poor. We will also show that child-
hood poverty leads to ill health in later life and a higher morbidity and 
mortality. These arguments do not need to rest on a definite conception 
of health but make use of the very plausible assumption that to suffer 
from certain diseases is a strong indicator of ill health. Furthermore, we 
want to stress again that the threshold against which we measure the 
effect of child poverty on the functioning of health as well as the other 
functionings we analyze are concerned with the inequality between poor 
and nonpoor children on the population level. It is unjust if children 
who are poor are more likely to be ill, even though certainly not all poor 
children are ill because of their poverty and ill health is something that 
is also common among nonpoor children. The insights we will present 
point in the direction that child poverty affects the health of many of 
these children and more so compared with their nonpoor peers, and 
this comparison shows that being healthy or having ill health is not 
an individual issue alone but rather a social one. The fact that nonpoor 
children have in general better health also shows that the state is in fact 
in a position to do better for those children in poverty. 
 The second one is that we choose to distinguish between physical and 
mental health because both are indeed equally important, but the latter 
is often neglected. In most examinations on why health is an issue of 
(social or global) justice, particularly in regard to the relation of poverty 
and health, the clear focus lies on physical health and on such issues 
as vaccinations and access to health care, sanitation and clean water in 
order to prevent severe illnesses that still kill millions of people, adults 
and children alike. 
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 We understand the reason for this focus – physical health is without 
any doubt a more severe and pressing problem in many places in this 
world, and it usually leads in a more direct or faster way to death than 
mental illness. On a global scale, the priority on physical health can 
therefore be justified in the context of social justice in modern societies, 
which have already reached a higher level of welfare and health even 
for many children in poverty and where child mortality from prevent-
able illnesses is fortunately rather rare. One can and should not dismiss 
mental health but rather acknowledge that children have a right to be 
physically and mentally healthy. Mental health issues are on the rise and 
are a significant burden for the individual who suffers from a mental 
health problem and her family, and on the epidemiological level, it is 
a great challenge for health care systems, the economy and the state 
(Prince et al. 2007; Wittchen et al. 2011). 
 The complex nature of mental health presents a further challenge: it is 
far less explored than physical health. In some dimensions, there is a clear 
and close connection between mental health and subjective well-being 
as well as happiness, which seems to stand in the way of making mental 
health an issue of justice in the same way as physical health (Cabezas, 
Graf and Schweiger 2014). We are aware of these issues as well as of the 
fact that mental health cannot be fully explored without leaving room 
for subjective evaluations and how children actually feel; we will explore 
some related issues in more detail when we come to see how children 
experience poverty. First, however, we will stick to the ‘hard’ medical 
and psychological evidence that already reveals important aspects of the 
relationship between child poverty and mental ill health. 
 Having these considerations in mind, what can we say about the effect 
poverty has on children’s health – as children and as the adults they will 
become? The medical evidence is clear: poverty during childhood affects 
many different aspects of the health of children, and it has long-ranging 
effects on adult health as well. 
 Let us elaborate this point by first looking at mental health. Poverty 
during childhood has been found to precede anxiety disorders, depres-
sion, post-traumatic stress disorder and academic underachievement 
(Nikulina, Widom and Czaja 2010; Santiago, Wadsworth and Stump 
2011); it has been shown to be detrimental to cognitive outcomes and 
to affect brain development, leading to behavioral disorders as well (Kim 
et al. 2013; Welsh et al. 2010). The reasons for these influences are still 
disputed, and many mediating mechanisms have been discussed. A recent 
overview of the evidence regarding the influence of childhood poverty 
on mental, emotional and behavioral health in the USA has proposed 
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the distinction between individual, relational and institutional factors 
(Yoshikawa, Aber and Beardslee 2012). Important factors found include 
the influence of family poverty on parenting stress, depressed parental 
mood, marital conflict and household violence; all of these correlate 
with neglect and reduced parent investment in the child. The lack of 
cognitively stimulating materials and experiences appears to contribute 
in particular to differences in cognitive development, which also affects 
the benefit children can obtain from schooling and further education. 
Neighborhood poverty, again, is related to an insecure environment, the 
quality of schooling and the availability of youth programs; exposure 
to these stressors may overwhelm children and influence their neural 
development. Studies that observed the influence of childhood poverty 
on adult mental health also found it to be correlated to a range of 
mental health problems and psychological disorders (Evans and Cassells 
2014; Gilman et al. 2002; Najman et al. 2010). This evidence on the ill-
being and ill-becoming due to child poverty makes clear that poverty 
heightens the risk of growing up in an adverse environment but that 
lack of money alone is not the cause for mental ill health. Rather, we 
must look at what is often caused by the combination of a low socio-
economic status and the lack of a comprehensive welfare system; namely, 
stress and insecurity, which affect families and children living in these 
circumstances in such a negative way. Evidence also shows that children 
in low socioeconomic level families show self-harming behavior such 
as overdose and self-injury, which, in turn, shows that poverty takes 
a high toll on the minds of children and adolescents (Ayton, Rasool 
and Cottrell 2003). While it is true that children in rich families might 
also develop mental ill health due to all the above-mentioned reasons, 
living in poverty makes it much more likely. Likewise, it is a problem of 
justice because poverty can be prevented. The effects of poverty during 
pregnancy have also been researched – it can act as a chronic stressor, 
and high levels of prenatal stress are suspected of negatively affecting 
the brain development of the fetus, which in turn leads to lower general 
intellectual and language abilities in toddlers (Laplante et al. 2004). 
 When it comes to physical health, studies have demonstrated many 
negative influences of child poverty on both children and adults: The 
low socioeconomic status of the mother is correlated with lower birth 
weight and preterm birth, both significant health risks for the infant 
(Dunkel Schetter and Lobel 2011). A recent study found that the effects 
of childhood poverty are especially predictive of cardiovascular disease 
and type II diabetes and that they appear in large part to be biologic-
ally embedded, such that later improved life circumstances have only a 
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modest ameliorative effect (Raphael 2011). Another study followed 9,760 
participants biennially from 1992 through 2006. Its results suggest that 
early-life socioeconomic experiences directly influence adult chronic 
disease outcomes for coronary heart disease (CHD), diabetes and stroke 
(Nandi et al. 2012). Asthma, too, seems to be influenced by the socio-
economic status of the child (Williams, Sternthal and Wright 2009). 
Due to these health risks, people growing up in poverty have a higher 
mortality rate and die younger than their nonpoor peers (Galobardes, 
Lynch and Smith 2004); child mortality itself is linked to socioeconomic 
position (Pritchard and Williams 2011). The pathways are, again, multi-
factorial (Melchior et al. 2007): the environment is linked to a range 
of influencing factors, for example, lack of heating and poor ventila-
tion; these can trigger processes called biological embedding, by which 
experiences during early childhood alter the neurological and physical 
development (Hertzman and Boyce 2010; Hertzman et al. 2010). Risky 
behaviors that become chronic, possibly influencing adult health, are 
another mediating mechanism. Moreover, children who grow up poor 
often stay poor as adults, and this adulthood poverty is a major influ-
ence on adult health and mortality. In a recent review Dennis Raphael 
described how childhood poverty has cumulative effects on health and 
translates into adulthood:
 Cumulative effects are illustrated by findings that the longer children 
live under conditions of material and social deprivation, the more 
likely they are to show adverse health and developmental outcomes. 
These can be cognitive deficits that contribute to lack of school readi-
ness for children (e.g., physical health and well-being, social compe-
tence, emotional maturity, language and cognitive development, 
and communication skills and general knowledge) upon entering 
the education system. Cumulative adverse experiences during early 
childhood predispose children towards learned helplessness where 
children feel unable to act effectively upon their world. Such help-
lessness is a strong determinant of health in general and a precursor 
of adopting health threatening behaviours. (Raphael 2011, 25) 
 It is not always possible to disentangle these influences, which can lead 
to vicious circles over the life course. Child poverty leads to ill health, 
and both can contribute to lower educational outcomes; lower educa-
tional outcomes, in turn, lead to a lower socioeconomic position in 
later life, which, again, is related to several factors that can contribute 
to ill health. This cycle is then passed on to the next generation, to 
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children who are once again born poor and have fewer life chances and 
a higher risk of staying poor and being less healthy. An example of how 
child poverty affects physical health, affecting as a consequence other 
important functionings, is the issue of obesity. It is now well established 
that childhood poverty increases the probability of being obese, an effect 
that can already be observed in very young children and babies (Conrad 
and Capewell 2012). Obesity is therefore not a lifestyle choice of these 
children but the result of the environment they are born into (Johnson, 
Pratt and Wardle 2011). Obesity during childhood is connected to a wide 
range of further health risks, being linked, in particular, to cardiovascular 
disease and diabetes but also to mental health problems, such as depres-
sion (Levine 2011; Pizzi and Vroman 2013). Again, we by no means wish 
to deny that obesity during childhood also happens in well-off families 
but rather opt to reinforce the idea that more children in poverty are 
affected due to their being poor, which is sufficient for our claim that 
child poverty violates the claims of these children to be healthy. In an 
older review, Richard Reading presented good reasons why poverty is, in 
fact, the cause for ill health and health disparities in a society, reasons 
that still hold: research is consistent; the relation between poverty and 
child health can be found in every country; there is historical evidence 
that shows this relation is not new; there is an incremental relation; 
and the relation between health and poverty has been shown for many 
different forms of material and social deprivation (Reading 1997). 
 In conclusion, the evidence we presented here shows that child 
poverty and physical and mental health are connected; child poverty 
influences it negatively and has negative effects on adult health as well. 
It undermines the equality of opportunity to well-being. Epidemiological 
studies, however, can give an insight as to the extent of the problem. A 
recent estimation for the USA concluded that approximately 245,000 
deaths in the year 2000 were attributable to low levels of education, 
176,000 to racial segregation, 162,000 to low social support, 133,000 to 
individual-level poverty, 119,000 to income inequality and 39,000 to 
area-level poverty (Galea et al. 2011). Another study suggests that in the 
European Union, 700,000 deaths and 33 million prevalent cases of ill 
health were caused by socioeconomic inequality (Huisman et al. 2013). 
We cannot put a definite number on the injustice of ill health caused 
by child poverty, but statistics attest that millions of children are living 
in poverty in modern welfare states. If there is sufficient evidence that 
many of them are ill simply because they are poor and that being poor 
puts them at a higher risk of becoming ill than their nonpoor peers, 
it is enough to criticize this situation as unjust as well as to claim that 
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these societies are failing the demands of justice for children. They let 
children down on their justified claims to well-being and well-becoming 
and deprive them of a fertile functioning, which in turn affects the 
achievement of other important functionings and capabilities. 
 One might counter our conclusion about the relation between health 
and poverty by pointing to parents and families, shifting the blame 
from the institutional design of society to them. They choose to live 
under such circumstances and bring children into the world, and they 
do not move to better neighborhoods, give them better food and care or 
take them to regular medical checkups. Child poverty is, indeed, in most 
cases also family poverty (important exceptions are orphans in state care 
and unattended minor refugees) and the parents’ living conditions and 
socioeconomic status do have significant influence on their children. 
We will address this issue in the next chapter, where we will analyze the 
role of close caregivers and their responsibilities toward children in some 
detail and refute the argument that parents and families are the primary 
agents for securing social justice for children. For now, we would like to 
point to the fact that parents and families in poverty usually have very 
limited options to influence the health of their children due to struc-
tural deficiencies, a fact that is to be taken into account when conceptu-
alizing their responsibilities. Parents’ behaviors are partially determined 
themselves by socioeconomic position and how one grows up and is 
socialized, a claim supported by considerable evidence (Pinderhughes 
et al. 2001; Russell, Harris and Gockel 2008). 
 2.3 The Ill-Being and Ill-Becoming of child poverty: 
social inclusion and education 
 The next two functionings we would like to explore are social inclu-
sion and education. Again, we see good reason that they should pass 
the test and fulfill the five criteria we laid out above and also the sixth, 
which puts higher priority on fertile functionings and the prevention 
of corrosive disadvantages. Both are important for the well-being and 
well-becoming in the sense that they are both essential for an adult as 
well. They can be measured objectively with the usual caveats. It also 
seems not unreasonable to assume that children themselves view social 
inclusion and education as important, although maybe the latter not 
in the same way as adults think of it. Both are influenced by the insti-
tutional design of a society, and each and every child can achieve both 
functionings under the right circumstances. Even children with severe 
cognitive disabilities have a right to be educated in a way appropriate to 
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their capacities. In addition, we claim that both are fertile functionings, 
and we will introduce some arguments to bolster that assumption in the 
following. 
 We will use very broad conceptions of both social inclusion and educa-
tion, leaving the decision to further define them again to the respective 
studies we examine. We employ a negative approach, one that is satis-
fied with showing that child poverty actually negatively affects social 
inclusion and education and that children in poverty have a less of a 
chance to achieve those two functionings than their better-off peers. 
We therefore do not have a threshold for what each and every child is 
entitled to, a specific kind of education in terms of what they need to 
learn or how long they should go to school. Other specialists can answer 
these questions much better; there are probably differences between the 
respective education systems that must be taken into account. What 
seems obvious is that for children growing up and living in modern 
societies, education is not a matter of learning to read and write alone 
but also of being prepared for what a highly complex and differenti-
ated society and its social, economic, political and cultural institutions 
demand. This is the aspect of well-becoming that is always relative to the 
standards in a given context and that is also risky to some extent, given 
that we cannot foresee the future. It can be the case – there have been 
many cases in the past – that children are educated and learn things 
they cannot use because technology changes or the knowledge and skills 
are no longer useful. The content and also the threshold in education 
and social inclusion that is necessary in order to fulfill the demands of 
social justice is therefore highly context sensitive and evolving. Studies 
on the future of education show this in an impressive manner (Redecker 
et al. 2011). Furthermore, we are not able to set different thresholds for 
different ages, although it is something that would be equally neces-
sary to effectively guide policies. Such a more in-depth examination of 
education and child poverty, one that analyzes different age groups and 
different contexts (states or regions), is surely a worthy venture, which, 
however, goes beyond the limited scopes and aims of our treatise. 
 We will begin with the functioning of social inclusion, using, as we 
have just stated, a very broad understanding of it. Social inclusion is 
closely connected to material resources, on the one hand, and to the 
public infrastructure (in a broad sense), on the other hand. It encom-
passes being able to do and have things that are viewed as essential or 
normal in a society and that are necessary to keep up social relations 
with people outside one’s own family. Such an approach to social inclu-
sion (or its counterpart, social exclusion) is now used in many different 
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contexts, but the concept has also been criticized for being too vague 
and for being unclear about what it wants to capture due to, among 
other reasons, the existence of so many different definitions available; 
a recent review names eighteen different definitions (Morgan et al. 
2007). Many approaches share striking similarities with deprivation 
measures as originally proposed by Townsend, but instead of looking 
at goods (which dominate the lists of both the EU and UNICEF), they 
also consider such other contexts of participation and inclusion as 
employment, politics and decision-making and culture and leisure. The 
benchmark used to define these contexts or activities is the same as with 
deprivation indicators: what is essential or normal in a specific society. 
For example, Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud defined four dimen-
sions for adults in the United Kingdom, which can probably be viewed 
to cover all modern welfare states: (a) consumption, (b) production, (c) 
political engagement and (d) social interaction. They have also set four 
corresponding indicators: (a) equivalent household net income under 
half median income, (b) not employed or self-employed, in education or 
training, looking after family, (c) nonvoter, not a member of community 
organizations and (d) lack of someone who can offer personal support 
(Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud 2002). Two things become obvious 
when considering this approach: one activity (consumption) is, again, 
measured using income, and two of the others go certainly beyond what 
many would understand as poverty (political engagement and social 
interaction). Surely people can lack the last two without being (materi-
ally) poor for various reasons. 
 The concept of social inclusion/exclusion has been less often applied 
to children; we suppose that this reflects the (implicit) assumption that 
children are less active than adults (or that there are fewer important 
contexts in which children should be included). On the contrary, we 
want to make the point that children can be included in or excluded from 
many different contexts that matter for them, their well-being and their 
well-becoming: school, political participation, leisure and friends, health 
care, social services, rights, a safe and clean environment, among others. 
Such contexts matter highly to children (Ridge 2002). The social inclu-
sion/exclusion paradigm offers valuable insights into understanding child 
poverty and its effects on the well-being and well-becoming of children. It 
highlights the relations between the different dimensions of social life; for 
example, between material goods and income and other forms of partici-
pation. It also shows that income alone is often not enough for one to be 
(fully) included in a society, since other factors like ethnicity, age, educa-
tion, employment and health are equally important and lead to exclusion 
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processes. This certainly has implications for social policy: benefits alone 
will not be enough to solve the problem of social exclusion. The fact that 
social exclusion is a relational concept poses another issue and shows that 
social relations are of utmost importance. Inclusion and exclusion are 
processes that unfold through the interactions within certain social envir-
onments and contexts and reshape the opportunities persons have. There 
is a link between the main assumption of the capability approach, namely 
that capabilities and functionings are dependent on different conversion 
factors, and this relational dimension of social inclusion/exclusion. Being 
excluded means to be cut off from important conversion factors other 
people have access to as well. Social inclusion/exclusion is also more of 
a process than a static concept (Millar 2007). One is included through 
activities, doing certain things on a regularly basis and being part of social 
groups. Social inclusion is therefore not a functioning one can acquire 
at a certain point in time and keep without putting constant effort into 
it. Social inclusion has also a spatial dimension; where children live and 
how their neighborhood and environment look have a great influence on 
what they can do and have and on what kind of relations they can have 
to other people (MacDonald and Marsh 2005). 
 Social inclusion has two sides, an internal and an external one. The 
external side can be evaluated by looking at what children in poverty are 
actually doing and having; the internal side, on the other hand, has an 
emotional aspect and refers to the actual feeling and knowing that one 
is included and accepted. The concept of respect and the functioning 
of being respected as a human of equal worth, which we will discuss 
later in this chapter, also comes into play here. Both the internal and 
external dimension of social inclusion are fertile: the internal dimension 
is closely related to self-efficacy and other positive self-relations of self-
trust and self-esteem, which in turn are fertile for the development and 
achievement of other capabilities and functionings – children that have 
them are more likely to explore their potentials and try to succeed. The 
external dimension of social inclusion is fertile because having social 
relations and being accepted and recognized by others and in the social 
world one lives in gives a child much more valuable options and makes 
it easier to realize them. Social inclusion is important if a child needs 
help; for example, if she struggles at school or if she has problems with 
her parents; it is important in later life because it can provide networks 
and is a form of social capital that has been shown to be beneficial espe-
cially for economic status (Pichler and Wallace 2008). 
 Hence, social inclusion in capability terms refers to the ability to 
achieve functionings and capabilities as a child that are viewed as 
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essential in the target society and to be respected as a human of equal 
worth. Therefore, social inclusion/exclusion is a relational concept that 
cannot be defined without reference to the target society. This has two 
implications: at first, social inclusion has intrinsic and instrumental 
value for children, but it is a neutral concept in relation to its specific 
content in a specific context. 
 We are aware that our claim that children have a right to be included 
as a matter of justice runs the risk of being interpreted as if we supported 
the existing capitalistic shaping of society and those behaviors and 
norms that it demands (Bowring 2000). This would be highly problem-
atic, since it would mean that we support a social, political and economic 
formation that is one of the main causes of child poverty itself. While 
the claim that children are entitled to be included holds, being some-
thing of the utmost importance for their well-being and well-becoming, 
this does not imply that we are not critical of many social practices that 
children want to be part of or that they are actually included in. Social 
inclusion can also imply adhering to racist, sexist or ableist behaviors and 
attitudes and fitting into a strict social hierarchy. Such social inclusion 
is still beneficial for children because the costs of not fitting in are very 
high, but it is also obvious that such exclusionary patterns of inclusion 
are highly problematic from a moral point of view and affect negatively 
all of those excluded by these practices. It is disputable whether social 
inclusion can ever function without certain excluding mechanisms, but 
there are certainly forms and modes of inclusion that are less problem-
atic than others. Likewise, children are in a very weak position to stand 
up against the societal norms they are confronted with, and demanding 
that they be critical and strong enough to withdraw from consumerist 
behaviors would overburden them. 
 Furthermore, social inclusion happens on different levels and can 
take many different forms. To be included in a specific group may come 
at the cost of exclusion from other groups. For example, children and 
adolescents can be included in a street gang and experience many of 
the positive functions of inclusion through this, but by doing so, they 
more or less willingly choose not to be included in the larger society in 
all aspects. Deviant and criminal behavior is simultaneously the ticket 
into one group and out of the societal mainstream. On the other hand, 
there are differences between states and cultures within states. Being 
socially included in Germany might imply having and doing different 
things than being included in the United States of America, even if there 
are certain similarities between all highly developed societies. What we 
claim is that child poverty distorts opportunities for these children to 
98 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
be socially included in the society they live in; this holds for all modern 
societies. One of the main reasons is that inclusion and money are 
closely related, and as general features of all modern societies, inclusion 
reflects this capitalistic consumerist culture. 
 For now, we want to focus on the external side of social inclusion, 
which has been largely researched since poverty research itself moved 
from one-dimensional measures of income poverty to the concept of 
social exclusion and material deprivation. Social exclusion may be due 
to a number of different reasons, and lack of money is, although very 
significant, just one of them (Tisdall et al. 2006). Money buys member-
ship in societies in which inclusion has high costs: cell phones, toys, 
clothes, leisure activities, sport clubs, trips, going out, eating at the mall 
and inviting friends. However, money is not the single factor for social 
inclusion; living conditions, social status, appearance, race and ethnicity, 
gender, health, education and disability also count. Not all of these are 
influenced by child poverty (or are a defining part of it), but most are. 
Children living in poverty have less access to transportation to come and 
go and meet friends, and their neighborhoods are less secure and provide 
less space for them to play safely and in a clean and welcoming envir-
onment. Children are also less often included due to the stigmatizing by 
others and prejudices against them, as when they are accused of being 
lazy, unclean or deviant. The shame that children in poverty feel can also 
lead to processes of self-chosen exclusion and to isolation and loneliness. 
Children with health problems or disabilities need more resources to be 
able to take part in many activities, resources that are often missing from 
families in poverty. Poor neighborhoods, poor health and poor inclusion 
go together (Cattell 2001). The social inclusion of children in poverty 
is more difficult for all these reasons, and many of them are not able 
to realize this important functioning in an adequately qualitative way. 
When we described ways to measure poverty, we presented data demon-
strating how children in low-income families were more likely to face 
problems when trying to be socially included; the data were measured 
by the access to child-related social goods and activities that (partly) 
constitute what it means to fit in and belong to a society. If they are 
missed, children feel left out – and with good reason: they are actually 
not included in a comprehensive understanding. Similar findings have 
been reported using different methodologies and measures for particular 
countries in Europe as well as the USA, Canada and Australia (Kahn and 
Kamerman 2002; Phillips et al. 2013). 
 There is an abundance of literature on education from a capability 
perspective (Hart, Babic and Biggeri 2014; Walker and Unterhalter 2010). 
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Most of the available empirical evidence on the relation of child poverty 
and education focuses either on cognitive skills or on schooling and 
academic achievement. Education is, however, more than that; the value 
of education is poorly reflected if one looks only at schooling and subse-
quently at the relation between formal education and other socioeconomic 
characteristics, a relation that is important and, in particular, relevant for 
the intergenerational transmission and reproduction of poverty. 
 Education here means any kind of learning and acquiring of skills and 
knowledge, and in this broad sense it is the condition and grounding 
of many other functionings and capabilities. The good command of 
one’s mother language is necessary for inclusion in the society and the 
interaction with other people; it is necessary to acquire further know-
ledge and skills and to achieve further capabilities and functionings. 
If one knows how to read, one can acquire all kinds of information 
available in that language. If one knows how to ride a bike or how to 
swim, one has obviously more choices of leisure activities and of getting 
from one place to another at one’s disposal. Acquiring manners and 
social skills, so-called soft skills, becoming acquainted with the customs 
and habits of one’s culture and society, make it a lot easier for one to 
appear in public, to interact with other people, to feel ‘at home’. Soft 
skills have become ever more necessary in the fast-changing economy 
of modern societies, in which formal education is just one aspect of 
qualification. Not only do children learn throughout childhood – yes, 
childhood can be characterized as life’s main learning phase – but the 
societal framing of childhood is that it should be a protected phase for 
learning and acquiring skills necessary for the child’s well-being as an 
adult. Education points, in particular, toward an understanding of child-
hood as a preparatory stage. Besides this orientation toward adulthood, 
education has certainly an intrinsic and instrumental value for children 
themselves as well, one that is also empowering and gives them more 
options and freedom as they mature, learn and become able to do more 
things. Still concerning education, we would like to argue that children 
are entitled to realize it as a functioning and that it would be wrong and 
unreasonable to advocate for it in the form of a capability. Children 
have an entitlement to actually learn and acquire necessary and fruitful 
skills and knowledge they need for their further flourishing. A child does 
not need the capability to choose whether she wants to learn a language 
and to write and how basic mathematics works for her well-being and 
well-becoming but actually needs to acquire them on a sufficient level. 
 It is interesting to note here that our advocacy for the actual realiza-
tion of education during childhood will almost certainly lead to the 
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result that in adulthood, too, people have it as a functioning, not only as 
a capability. Other important functionings or capabilities can be altered 
in later life, perhaps even denied. One can hurt herself or choose to 
destroy one’s health, one can choose to live a life in isolation or one 
can choose not to engage in politics, but it is very unlikely that one 
can choose to unlearn. If a child is educated and learns to read, write 
and acquire other knowledge and skills, it will be the case that at least 
some of them, maybe the most basic and important ones, will stick. A 
person might forget what she learned in biology and physics, but to 
count and make basic calculations or speak in one’s first language are 
hard to unlearn or willingly forget. Therefore – and we consider this a 
positive – education is a functioning that, if properly acquired in child-
hood, stays with one for the whole life course, unless severe mental 
illness or dementia destroys it. This points to another beneficial func-
tion of education; namely, that others are not able to destroy it so easily 
either and that it can aid in overcoming adverse situations, whether it be 
a personal crisis, life event or the rise of an oppressing regime. 
 Research about the relation of education and poverty is striking. 
Children in poverty fall behind in academic achievement very early, 
and their cognitive skills are less well developed. Recent studies confirm 
that this inequality becomes stronger during childhood and that chil-
dren who grow up in poverty acquire a lower formal education than 
their nonpoor peers (Engle and Black 2008). Poverty influences school 
readiness, drop-out and attendance habits (Zhang 2003; Welsh et al. 
2010). School is, for poor children, a less comfortable experience than 
it is for their nonpoor peers, and they struggle more often to get along 
(Horgan 2009). Sufficient evidence suggests that teachers treat chil-
dren from poor families worse and that the grades of children are influ-
enced by that (Ladd 2012; Auwarter and Aruguete 2008). Without any 
doubt, these effects on education during childhood also affect the later 
life of these children. It is much more difficult to catch up and acquire 
educational attainment as an adult, simply because there is much less 
support to invest the time needed, because the education systems are 
still designed in a way that supports linear biographies and because 
adults generally are slower in acquiring skills and knowledge. Some 
doors to education are more or less closed forever due to early develop-
ments and failings in achievements. The reasons for these low results 
of children in poverty are, again, manifold, and research has not estab-
lished a single best explanation (Ferguson, Bovaird and Mueller 2007). 
We have already mentioned that the home environment and whether it 
is stimulating or not plays a crucial role in the development of cognitive 
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and emotional skills. Parenting style and parents’ expectations of what 
they think their children can achieve are another factor associated with 
education outcomes. Such negative influences of parents on the educa-
tional achievements and development of their children is not the result 
of less interest in their children and in most cases also not the result of 
willing neglect, but the result of the parents’ own limitation due to their 
poverty and own knowledge. Sometimes it also reflects their own expe-
riences during childhood with teachers and in school. Other equally 
relevant factors are the health of the child and whether she has to be 
absent from school often due to health problems, as well as whether the 
parents have enough time and resources to support their child (Fiscella 
and Kitzman 2009). 
 Both teachers’ perceptions and expectations and the school itself play 
an important role as well. Children from poor families are more likely to 
go to schools that are worse equipped, have more children with social 
and behavioral problems and a less stimulating learning environment. 
These factors reinforce each other, and children in poverty grow up 
with fewer conversion factors that would help them realize their poten-
tial. According to the research of Chris Power and Clyde Hertzman, the 
corrosive disadvantage of child poverty in relation to education can be 
characterized as follows (Hertzman and Power 2003): Circumstances 
in the early years of life influence the cognitive, social and behavioral 
skills needed for readiness for school. Children who are not ready for 
school are more likely to experience low expectations of teachers, lose 
confidence, have difficulties making friends and face repeated academic 
failure. Readiness for school also influences school attendance and 
educational performance; these are important for educational achieve-
ment. Both home characteristics (material circumstances, parental 
involvement with and aspirations for their children) and school char-
acteristics are important. Feeling disengaged with and unsupported by 
school plays a role in developing health-damaging behaviors, such as 
cigarette smoking, and in developing sources of identity based around 
peer relationships and youth culture. 
 While psychologically important, these identities can result in behav-
iors such as nonattendance and law breaking, which further damage 
educational prospects. Early parenthood, too, can be an important 
source of identity but one that makes it harder to stay on at school 
and gain qualifications. Leaving school and not going on to education, 
training or employment leaves young people vulnerable to unemploy-
ment, with paid work restricted to unskilled and semiskilled jobs. These 
jobs are characterized by low payment and job insecurity, which may 
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bring further health costs in terms of higher rates of absence due to sick-
ness, disability and coronary heart disease. The environment of home 
and neighborhood can place further strains on physical and mental 
health. In consequence, poor adult circumstances take an additional 
toll on health, in part because they are implicated in the maintenance 
of health behaviors linked to chronic diseases such as coronary heart 
disease and cancer that underlie inequalities in health in adult life. 
 We now want to turn our attention to one important aspect of the well-
becoming of children and their inclusion as adults. An essential part of the 
social inclusion of adults, different from that of children, is that they are 
able to provide for themselves and their families through paid work and 
labor. Modern societies are also working societies in the sense that work 
and labor are highly valued, a major source for self-esteem, self-respect and 
self-worth and the main source of income and wealth, which in turn trans-
late into a variety of resources and goods. Work and labor are, so to speak, 
the main source to access important conversion factors for the majority 
of the population, being intrinsically valuable for many. These positive 
functionings of work and labor explain why their absence has such harsh 
consequences for many and why unemployment is one of the main sources 
for ill-being. One of the theories that tries to capture this relationship is 
Marie Jahoda’s (Jahoda 1981; Jahoda 1982) who distinguished manifest 
(income) and latent (time structure, social inclusion, goals, identity and 
status, activity) positive functions of employment. From them, she derived 
why unemployment is such a harsh experience, one that takes high tolls 
on the physical and mental health, social inclusion and private life of 
the unemployed. The usefulness of Jahoda’s model has been empirically 
tested over the years, and recent studies confirm that unemployment has 
such a detrimental effect on mental and physical health and social inclu-
sion because it leads to a deprivation of the manifest and latent functions 
(Paul and Batinic 2009). Only a few people are adequately equipped to 
effectively cope with involuntary unemployment, especially over a longer 
period of time. Unemployment also affects the lives of children whose 
parents are unemployed and who are confronted with the stress that their 
parents experience and the stigma of unemployment they have to battle, 
which seems to directly affect the child’s health. 
 We do not have a definite answer as to whether having paid employ-
ment is of such importance that it should be considered a capability that 
each and every one is entitled to as a matter of justice or whether the 
important thing is not having a paid job but rather having the oppor-
tunity to take care of oneself and those one cares about. We do not 
want to explore this issue here, although we still hold that the effects 
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of child poverty on the material and economic well-being in later life 
and the ability to participate in the labor market is of importance. We 
acknowledge that children are born with different talents and different 
natural internal capacities that will also influence what they can become 
in later life, but such natural differences cannot be held responsible for 
the differences in employment outcomes we can find in many modern 
societies. Findings suggest rather that employment opportunities – and 
with them also opportunities to gain a certain social status and income 
and wealth – are heavily influenced by the socioeconomic position of 
the parents. Again, we find here that the equality of opportunity to well-
being defined as important functionings and capabilities is not realized 
for all children, but those who are poor have it much harder and are 
significantly disadvantaged. The main causes for unemployment on 
the side of the individual are low-level formal education, health issues 
and, as we are able to witness today, age: right now, millions of young 
people across Europe are jobless as a consequence of the economic 
crisis. Both education and health are related to childhood poverty, as 
we have shown, and it is therefore not surprising that it is more likely 
for children from poor families to experience labor difficulties when 
they are older. Recent statistics convincingly underpin this claim: in 
the USA, the unemployment rate of persons with an academic degree 
(bachelor’s, master’s, professional or doctoral) ranges between 4 and 
2.2 percent; for persons with less than a high school diploma it reaches 
11 percent. Earnings are also highly correlated to formal education (see 
Table 2.8). The same results can be found in the European Union, where 
17.9 percent of the persons whose highest finished level of education is 
 Table 2.8  Education, unemployment and earning in the USA 
Education attained




Doctoral degree 2.2 1.623
Professional degree 2.3 1.714
Master’s degree 3.4 1.329
Bachelor’s degree 4 1.108
Associate’s degree 5.4 777
Some college, no degree 7 727
High school diploma 7.5 651
Less than a high school 
diploma
11 472
 Note: Data are for persons 25 and over. Earnings are for full-time wage and salary workers. 
 Source: Current Population Survey, US Department of Labor, US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_001.htm 
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less than primary, primary or low secondary education are unemployed, 
compared with 8.6 percent of those with high secondary and postsec-
ondary (nontertiary) education and 5.6 percent of those with a finished 
tertiary education. Employment status, material resources, education, 
health and social inclusion are closely entangled and influence each 
other (Gallie, Paugam and Jacobs 2003). They show that modern soci-
eties are not well equipped to realize equality of opportunity for well-
being for all its members and that it is especially hard for those who 
come from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
 In summary, what the empirical research shows is that child poverty 
is corrosive in regard to education and social inclusion of children, 
and both also affect the opportunities of inclusion in later life. They 
have also a wider effect on what can be called the capability to be a 
citizen with an equal standing. Elizabeth Anderson has argued that 
the capability set that people are entitled to as a matter of justice can 
be defined by looking at what they need to act as equals in a demo-
cratic society (Anderson 2010). This line of thought is similar to that 
of David Miller, who, not coming from a capability perspective, argues 
that there are two different types of equality: the first type of equality 
means equality in the distribution of certain goods (or functionings and 
capabilities), which should be equalized, and the second type refers to 
equality of social standing and the ideal of a society in which all meet on 
the same level (Miller 1999). While both are vague concepts, they bring 
forward the important idea of respect and being respected, which is 
closely connected to other important functionings and capabilities like 
self-esteem and self-worth. It is a simple fact that in modern working 
societies, social status, education, employment and income and wealth 
go hand in hand and that disadvantages during childhood that trans-
late into inequalities as an adult in these areas work against the ideal of 
equality proposed by Anderson and Miller. We should look not only at 
the outcomes of child poverty but also at the well-becoming, which is 
an equally important part of justice for children, and under the condi-
tions of a working society, children should be equipped with all neces-
sary functionings that let them become productive, equally respected 
and included citizens. 
 2.4 The subjective experience of child poverty 
 So far, we have discussed how child poverty leads to ill-being and ill-be-
coming, especially in relation to health, social inclusion and education. 
We now want to turn to the subjective experience of child poverty, how 
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children themselves view their situation and articulate it and how they 
feel about it. We have already mentioned that child poverty influences 
mental health, for example, depression. We have built our case so far on 
objective knowledge that is more or less free of subjective assessments 
and ignores how children feel about poverty and if their subjective well-
being or happiness is altered by it. The reason why we now want to give 
a voice to children that are actually living in poverty is threefold. First, 
we believe that children living in poverty have a right to be heard. We 
will explore here the difference between a consultative and an authorita-
tive view as presented by Harry Brighouse (2003) and further expanded 
by David Archard and Marit Skivenes (2009). This will also shed some 
more light on our claim in Chapter 1 that children’s views should be 
taken seriously in drafting a list of important functionings and capabil-
ities that matter for children`s well-being and to which they are entitled 
as a matter of justice. Second, we will argue that listening to children 
and taking notice of their subjective experiences deepens our under-
standing of the injustices they live with. Third, we will show that the 
way a child experiences poverty is – to a large extent – not arbitrary and 
that it therefore carries normative weight. In this context, the concept 
of humiliation will be of central importance. 
 Brighouse has argued that children should be listened to in matters 
affecting them but that they should not be granted an authoritative view 
over their own circumstances. In the end, adults have the right (and 
the duty) to act in the child’s best interest, which sometimes might go 
against the child’s will. This view is an advancement over how children 
were treated for a long time, but it still leaves them at adults’ disposal. 
The term ‘consultative view’ already implies that the child’s perspective 
has a certain value for those who have to act in the child’s interests but 
that this value is limited. Adults, in contrast, should be seen, as Brighouse 
argues, as authoritative in respect to choices that affect them, except for 
a few cases in which it is clear they are not competent enough to decide 
for themselves; for instance, when they have severe cognitive disabilities 
or mental disorders that temporarily render them incompetent. 
 Archard and Skivenes came to a very similar result after analyzing in 
detail several cases in which children’s views were heard and weighed 
in the context of legal decision-making in the domains of health in the 
United Kingdom and custody and child protection in Norway. They 
add, however, that children also have a right to be heard independ-
ently from the instrumental value that comes by listening to them (as 
they provide useful information) and that children’s views are therefore 
more than consultative. The issue we discuss in this chapter is different 
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from the context in which the distinction of consultative and authorita-
tive was developed. Brighouse, Archard and Skivenes are concerned with 
the participation of children in decision-making processes that affect 
their lives such as custody, medical treatment and probably also wider 
public matters, such as compulsory schooling. They also make use of 
the concept of best interest, which is commonly used in the children’s 
rights approach, and seek to balance the right of a child to be heard and 
to decide with the right of the child having her interests and well-being 
protected. It is not, they all agree, in the best interest of children to give 
them full command over their lives. 
 We are, however, concerned with a criticism of child poverty as unjust, 
and in most treatises criticizing certain injustices, views of the victims 
of these injustices are not decisive. The reasons to do so are very similar 
to those that resulted in opting for an objective account of justice as we 
developed it in the previous chapter. The foundational work has to be 
done more or less unrelated to how people actually feel or what prefer-
ences they have. As Sen, among others, has noted on several occasions, 
there is a need for objective measures because impoverished circum-
stances can make the victims of poverty allies of those who oppress them 
(Sen 1999; Khader 2011). Adaptive preferences demand an objective 
account of justice that has enough bite and argument on its side to 
allow for the critique of injustices, even if they are supported by those 
who suffer from them. 
 But why, then, is it important to listen to children living in poverty? 
We think that the distinctions between an authoritative view and a 
consultative view complemented by a right to be heard, introduced 
above, is particularly important here. Victims of injustices have a right to 
be heard by those who talk and write about those injustices. They have 
a right to be included in the analysis, even if that does not change how 
one designs a theory of justice and even if that does not alter substan-
tially the outcome of the philosophical work. People living in poverty 
are often treated as if they lack competence and knowledge; they are 
treated as passive objects of help, welfare and charity. They are rarely 
viewed as if they have much to contribute to overcoming their poverty 
and designing poverty-alleviation measures (Deveaux 2013). This view, 
however, has been criticized by participatory poverty research and 
poor-led initiatives for a long time now (Chambers 1997; Brock 1999). 
In fact, poor adults are often treated like children, in the sense that their 
choices and views are not seen as authoritative. 
 In summary, there are issues of inequalities in power and also in 
epistemic power, as in the power to decide who is poor and what matters 
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for being accounted poor. Children in poverty are particularly powerless, 
and their agency is often neglected. We believe that it is important to 
acknowledge that children in poverty have something to say about their 
situation and that this is of value for a normative theory about their 
lives. These children have a right to be included in the evaluation of 
their situation even if we can include them only indirectly and through 
the reception of participatory and qualitative studies of child poverty. 
This right is independent of our claim that this will enlarge and deepen 
our knowledge base and that taking into account subjective views on 
poverty, therefore, also has also an instrumental value. This right to be 
heard is a form of respect that each and every child is entitled to and is 
thus rooted in a fundamental aspect of our theory of justice for children. 
We add as well that the process of participatory work with children in 
poverty is itself valuable for these children, as it can have empowering 
effects (Pascal and Bertram 2009). It can show these children that there 
are people who care about how they live; it can offer them the experi-
ence of being heard and an awareness that their views actually matter to 
someone, if just to a researcher or research team. 
 The instrumental value of subjective views on poverty is that it can 
bring to attention issues that remain otherwise undetected and over-
looked. Children in poverty can point toward what matters most to 
them; this alone is reason enough to at least reflect carefully about their 
status in a theory of justice. Surely this is also dependent on the compe-
tence and maturity of the child, and many children might downplay 
important injustices that happen in their lives because they are not aware 
of them or because they cannot know how corrosive a specific depriv-
ation will be over the long run. It can be expected that children also 
have more to say about their actual well-being or ill-being than about 
their well-becoming or ill-becoming. The subjective experience of harm 
is focused on what is actually happening and not on what will or can 
happen in a few years from now. Their views are consultative in the best 
understanding of it: they give us more information, they help us make 
better decisions about what matters in a criticism of poverty and make 
better evaluations of their lives, and they give us an impression about 
what poverty does to children on the subjective level – how they feel it. 
Still, an injustice is an injustice even if these children do not experience 
poverty as harmful and even if they find ways to be happy and to adapt 
to their situations. This kind of information is also valuable, though. 
Another important instrumental value of first-person knowledge about 
poverty is that it can help design better poverty-alleviation measures or 
better implement them in practice. 
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 There are different approaches to listening to children in poverty 
and to giving them a place in our theory. We want to make a distinc-
tion between ‘thinking small’ and ‘thinking big’ to explore them, a 
distinction first suggested by David Hulme in an article on the situ-
ation of a poor family in Bangladesh, which he researched for more 
than twenty years (Hulme 2004). Hulme starts with the observation 
that most poverty research ‘thinks big’, in the sense that the researchers 
care mostly about statistics; that is, about how many people are poor 
and how many things they are missing and so on. He claims that while 
this thinking big is of course valuable, it is also in danger of over-
looking what poverty is on the individual or family level, how it is 
actually experienced and lived and what it does to a person and his 
or her family. This is something that cannot adequately be reflected 
in statistics that show how many millions of people are poor and how 
much income they have. Hulme claims especially that social embed-
ding and the many different dimensions of poverty are best under-
stood by ‘thinking small’; that is, by doing small-scale research that 
focuses on the story of one person or one household or one small 
community – this alone allows us to capture the breadth and depth of 
what it actually means to live in poverty. This thinking small is akin to 
the concept of ‘thick descriptions’ of poverty, in the sense that detailed 
accounts of a single story reflect the many different aspects and dimen-
sions of poverty. 
 Thick descriptions provide a window into the reality of poverty. They 
do not and cannot aim to cover varieties of poverty or give an under-
standing of different socioeconomic positions or how poverty looks in 
different regions or states. A single story of an individual or a family is 
not more than that, but it is ‘thick’, as is every individual life, and it also 
makes the injustices connected to poverty more visible and tangible. 
Thinking big as the counterpart of this kind of thinking small means 
having ‘thin descriptions’, abstract knowledge about many persons 
stripped of their individuality. That knowledge comes in statistics that 
can show us how many people live under the poverty line, how well 
they are educated and how many people live in a specific household. 
Data like this are valuable, no doubt, and are necessary to guide and 
monitor policies as they can tell us how many people moved in or out 
of poverty. The individual stories behind these numbers, however, are 
gone – why a specific individual struggles to come out of poverty, what 
problems lie in her past and what aspirations she has for herself and her 
children. Hulme is right with respect to the fact that there is no ‘either 
or’ between thinking small and thinking big, but we need both if we 
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want to understand poverty. There is also a need for thinking small and 
using thick descriptions in normative criticism of poverty and theories 
about its injustice. 
 We would like to take a third route, which we see as being somewhat 
in the middle and can perhaps be described as ‘thinking intermediate’. 
In this section, we will not discuss a thick description of child poverty, 
although we would welcome such an approach – it could certainly 
enrich the philosophical thinking about it. We will rather present know-
ledge gathered by qualitative and participatory studies that let children 
express and articulate their views on their own poverty and on poverty 
in general. Such studies give insight into important aspects of the 
subjective experience of poverty by providing many voices, not simply 
a single one or a few, as does a ‘thick description’. We will acknowledge 
what children have to say and that they have a right to be heard by us, 
but we are also able to do that on a level that allows the representing 
of many experiences from different children living in different environ-
ments and under different conditions. 
 Child poverty is a harmful experience for most children; they are 
aware of their situation and cope with it in many different ways. Some 
children are better equipped to cope than others, and some prove very 
resilient. It is therefore not surprising that the experiences of children 
living in poverty vary to a great degree. Qualitative studies on child 
poverty were recently summarized by Tess Ridge; we present here some 
of her key findings (Ridge 2011; Ridge 2009). The studies she surveyed 
cover children from five to seventeen. The first important insight is that 
children are aware of a wide range of impacts poverty has on their lives. 
Ridge presents children’s views on such issues as school, family and peer 
relations, the working situation of the parents, their neighborhood and 
public infrastructure, their economic situation and material deprivation 
and their emotions and feelings. Children also report how they try to 
cope with their situation, ignore it or retreat from social relations or 
try to support their parents and siblings. The second finding is that, 
in the view of children, child poverty has three central dimensions of 
disadvantage: material and economic deprivation, social exclusion and 
disruption or distortion of social relations, and emotional costs. Children 
worry about the family’s income; they are aware that they have fewer 
resources and goods. They value friendships but have problems making 
and keeping friends. They are the victims of bullying and of the discrim-
inating behavior of adults as well. They feel stigmatized, excluded and 
of little worth. Many children are frustrated and angry, as they have less 
than others and are afraid of how the future will turn out. 
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 Health, too, is an issue; children report that they are often sick, that they 
are cold in the winter and that heating and ventilation are often broken 
and seldom repaired. Health is also an issue because parents or caregivers 
are sick or disabled, and children are burdened with the care themselves. 
This attests, once again, to the multidimensionality of child poverty and 
how different disadvantages intersect and foster each other. Child poverty 
does not simply attack one functioning but more than one at a time, 
making it even more complicated to cope with. Other reviews of qualita-
tive literature come to the same conclusions (Attree 2006; Attree 2004); 
we would like to quote one case study here to illustrate how deprived 
living conditions, social stigmatization and health intersect:
 Eight-year-old Ben lives with his mother and two brothers in an 
overcrowded ground floor flat. Shortly after the family moved in, a 
severe damp and mold problem developed. An environmental health 
inspector has declared the property unfit for human habitation on two 
separate occasions. “It’s the smell that’s almost the worst thing. It’s so 
bad when you come into the flat” describes Ben’s mother, Sandra. The 
damp and mold is having a severe impact on the children’s health, 
which is affecting their education because they are missing school so 
often due to illness. “My oldest little boy [Ben] is having difficulties at 
school. And he’s had so much time off, so when you have lots of time 
off it makes things much worse.” The children’s mental health is also 
being affected. Ben is being teased at school because his clothes smell 
of damp, which is affecting his self-confidence. “It’s not right ... to 
be told that you smell. Kids are so cruel. [Ben] was teased for it. He’s 
seeing the child psychologist now because he has low self-esteem.” 
The condition of the house makes it difficult for him to have friends 
round to play, which is impacting on his social development. “When 
my friend comes round he says [my home] stinks and when I go to 
school this boy says my clothes stink ... but Mummy washes them” 
(Ben aged eight). (Ridge 2009, 33) 
 The third insight is that different agents in the lives of these children, 
especially peers, shape the experience of child poverty. Children in 
poverty do not merely lack specific functionings (or resources) they 
experience this lack as harmful, especially in interaction with other 
people, children and adults alike; within different institutions, the harm 
of poverty becomes pressing. These experiences add insult to injury; on 
the one hand, they are embedded in a societal climate in which poverty 
is framed to a large extent as personal failure and in which the blame 
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for child poverty is put on parents and families; it is often accompanied 
by sexism, which targets lone mothers as bad mothers, unable to keep a 
husband that could care for them and their children; the same framing 
is also prevalent in the discourse about poverty and obese children 
(Maher, Fraser and Wright 2010). Such an atmosphere is equally present 
in the experience of children, who are well aware of how they and their 
families are perceived in the public and by others. While the polit-
ical discourse claims to view children as innocent victims of poverty 
who deserve our help, the experience of many children in poverty is 
a different one. On the other hand, the experience of child poverty is 
framed in a consumerist society that entangles self-realization and iden-
tity with brands: having certain goods, wearing certain clothes, doing 
certain leisure activities (Elliott and Leonard 2004). A child being bullied 
for not having something is the collateral damage of such a culture. The 
role of peers poses several ethical challenges, as they themselves are not 
fully competent and hence also not fully responsible for their actions, 
often just reproducing cultural norms and values. 
 We now introduce the concept of ‘humiliation’ to capture the 
subjective experience of poverty by children. We do not want to include 
all aspects of poverty articulated by children as important, but, in our 
judgment, a central one. Humiliation is the counterpart to respect and 
the functioning of being respected. There is also some overlap between 
being respected and mental health in the sense that being mentally 
healthy also means achieving positive self-awareness in the form of self-
trust, self-esteem and self-respect. Humiliation has two distinct dimen-
sions: on the one hand, it can describe a certain kind of emotion and 
feeling; one feels humiliated. On the other, it can describe certain kinds 
of actions perceived as humiliating. In many cases they go hand in 
hand: a humiliating action leads to the feeling of being humiliated on 
the side of the victim. This connection is not necessary, though, and 
some actions judged by many or most as humiliating might not trigger 
the emotion of being humiliated, and in some cases, people may feel 
humiliated even if there is no sound reason. 
 Child poverty is humiliating in both senses: it is typically perceived 
by children as humiliating and it is an act of humiliation itself. Child 
poverty is a condition with which acts of humiliation by other people 
are connected, and being poor is in itself humiliating even if there are no 
such acts of humiliation by other persons. At least two questions must 
then be clarified: first, how can humiliation be defined, and second, in 
what sense can a certain living condition be humiliating in itself without 
another person committing acts of humiliation? 
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 We borrow our definition of humiliation from Evelin Lindner, who 
writes that the core of humiliation is an enforced lowering of another 
person, which attacks the dignity and self-worth of that person (Lindner 
2007). We view this in connection with respect and the functioning 
of being respected, which we have explored in the previous chapter. 
Children are respected when they are treated in a way that corresponds 
with their worth as humans. Other theorists, most prominently Martha 
Nussbaum, use the concept of human dignity to capture this (Nussbaum 
2011). Humiliation is an umbrella term that catches the many forms of 
actions that violate the entitlement to be treated as a person of equal 
worth while describing the subjective experience of a person who feels 
she is not treated as an equal by others. It is also possible, we will argue, 
that children experience this feeling and emotion of being less worthy 
than others due to their poverty, even if there are no particular acts of 
humiliation against them. This understanding is much wider than that 
of Avishai Margalit, for example, who connects humiliation with respect 
in the sense of being a part of the community of humans (Margalit 
1996). Margalit considers humiliation an act that gives other persons 
good reason to feel expelled from the community of humans, and he 
reserves the term ‘insult’ for acts that attack the self-esteem of a person. 
We prefer a wider understanding of humiliation that also encompasses 
all such acts of insult. Children in poverty are lowered by others and 
given the feeling that they are of less worth, which does not neces-
sarily imply a more drastic sense, such as no longer being viewed as 
human. The insights from qualitative studies discussed before point in 
this direction and can be captured with our understanding of humili-
ation. We have here actions of humiliation from peers and adults that 
hurt children, and we find the whole range of emotional responses and 
feelings of being humiliated that are known to have potentially severe 
consequences. 
 Growing up and living in poverty is in itself humiliating even if 
children do not encounter humiliating acts by others: it can never be 
detached from the experience of having less than others without a good 
reason. This claim is supported in the literature and what children tell 
us about how they view themselves and their lives. Having less than 
others is obvious for a child in poverty; even when no one makes fun of 
her because of it, the child knows, sees and experiences that she has less, 
that she cannot have the same clothes and toys, make the same trips 
and live in the same good buildings as others. The persistent inequality 
in all poverty makes it humiliating. This line of argument adapts the 
thoughts of Christian Neuhäuser and Julia Müller, who have argued that 
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relative poverty (of adults) is humiliating because the poor know about 
their poverty and that they have less than what is the normal standard 
in the society they live in (Neuhäuser and Müller 2011). The argument is 
not that having few goods or resources is in itself necessarily humiliating 
but that in a society in which it is normal to have certain goods, those 
who involuntarily have far fewer can experience humiliation because, as 
outsiders, they have good reason to feel less worth and less respect. The 
contingent significance of certain goods, resources or activities is rele-
vant to determining whether not having them is humiliating. We have 
briefly discussed the concept of material deprivation of Peter Townsend 
above, which defines poverty using goods and services viewed as essen-
tial in a given society, and such a relative approach to poverty is what 
brings to light why poverty is humiliating even if those who are poor 
are treated in a friendly manner. In the case of children, we would add, 
it is furthermore impossible to argue that their having less and being 
able to do less is a result of choices and bad decisions they made in the 
past. We would like to refute such a line of argument for adult poverty as 
well, but we shall leave that point aside here and refer to Neuhäuser and 
Müller, who have sufficiently argued against it (Neuhäuser and Müller 
2011). When it comes to children, it is clear that it is even worse if they 
rationalize in such a way that they begin to blame themselves for being 
poor or blame their parents and families. 
 The concept of humiliation is certainly not only a descriptive one. 
It has normative weight, and many theories of justice acknowledge it. 
The absence of (systematic) humiliation is an important aspect of any 
just society. This applies to both acts and living conditions that can be 
described as humiliating and to feelings and emotions of humiliation. 
Put in positive terms, a just society is one in which persons are treated 
with respect and assured of their equal worth as human beings regardless 
of what they do, how they live or how old or competent they are. The 
ability to be in public without being ashamed has long been recognized 
by capability theorists and also in empirical poverty research (Zavaleta 
Reyles 2007). While acts of humiliation that target this entitlement are 
more easily banned, feelings of humiliation are not controllable in that 
sense. Including them here in our criticism of poverty, thus, somehow 
opens up the door we shut on subjective assessments as benchmarks for 
justice. We claim that all the functionings children are entitled to as a 
matter of justice should be objective and that only they matter when 
uncovering and criticizing the injustice of child poverty. But using the 
concept of humiliation points to the direction that there is more than 
just the instrumental value to listen to the subjective experiences of 
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children in poverty that we have appreciated before. We want to make 
a proposal on how humiliation, in the subjective sense of a feeling, and 
the claim for objectivity can work together. 
 Firstly, it must be noted that feelings of humiliation are to a large 
extent not arbitrary. There are good reasons to assume that in the over-
whelming majority of cases in which children feel humiliated, there 
are actually acts of humiliation, or these feelings are connected to the 
experience of the humiliating condition of being poor. The qualitative 
evidence we have discussed and on which we build our case examines 
exactly these links between poverty and various experiences of humili-
ation, and it cannot be said that the feelings and emotions of these 
children are unjustified or distorted. Today we have sufficient evidence 
that shame and humiliation are, in general, features of poverty, whether 
it be in rich or poor societies, and that children and adults alike feel 
ashamed and humiliated for being poor (Walker et al. 2013). There are 
certainly cases of children in poverty feeling humiliated without such 
good reasons, and in some cases, the direct connection to poverty has 
to be questioned, but if one leaves the individual level and looks at all 
the evidence brought by different studies, one must acknowledge the 
consistency of the results. 
Secondly, another important aspect is that the expressions of feelings 
of humiliation are a very important indicator that something is going 
wrong.  The goal of justice for children is not that they will never feel 
humiliated by others or that they are always to be happy, something that 
cannot be controlled without employing unethical measures, but that 
the feelings of humiliation are not systematically attached to a certain 
social position, especially not to one that is unjust in itself. Under the 
condition that child poverty is unjust – we hope we have made a good 
case for that – the fact that these children are systematically humili-
ated and have to experience feelings and emotions of being humiliated 
adds another dimension of injustice. Justice still needs objective bench-
marks – one of which is that acts and conditions of humiliation can be 
evaluated without reference to the feelings and emotions they trigger on 
the side of the victims – but it adds more depth to our criticism, especially 
a dimension that children care about strongly. This is the third point we 
wish to make: children do not want to feel left out, excluded, ashamed, 
humiliated and denigrated. Rather, they want to be respected in spite 
of their lack of competence or knowledge to articulate it adequately. 
If we do care about justice for children and their well-being and well-
becoming, we also have to care about how they actually feel and the 
harm they experience. In some cases, as we have stated, we cannot do 
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much about the harm – some experience of harm is part of every human 
life – and in other cases we will come to the conclusion that the feelings 
and emotions of a child are misguided and do not violate her claims 
of justice; these cases, however, do not undermine the general entitle-
ment to be respected and to not feel humiliated by others or by one’s 
social position. We must adapt society in a way that such a picture is 
possible. Feelings of being humiliated, especially chronic humiliation 
through repeated experiences of humiliation, are also harmful in under-
mining self-worth, self-esteem, self-respect and the ability to have trust 
in the world (Leask 2013). All these can be described, objectively, as 
highly important functionings for the well-being and well-becoming of 
a child. 
 2.5 Conclusions 
 Children in poverty suffer from deprivation of important functionings 
and capabilities, which they experience as harmful – especially humili-
ation, which violates their entitlement to respect and self-respect is 
important here. Justice for children must also be aware of the particular 
vulnerability of children and their powerlessness in regard to many of 
the threats and dangers they face. Child poverty is one of these threats. 
Children have no real power to evade their poverty and its negative 
consequences. We believe this to be one of the aspects that make child 
poverty special and a more severe injustice than adult poverty. Adults 
in poverty also suffer from ill health, are excluded and have less access 
to education; they share many feelings and experiences articulated by 
children, but children are much less able to do anything about their 
poverty as they are more dependent. Yes, adults in poverty are, too, 
often powerless themselves and have only limited options and no voice 
and no political weight, but, for children, the situation is still different; 
it is a categorical feature of being a child to be vulnerable, and poverty 
takes advantage of that and leads to severe consequences. 
 Child poverty affects particularly vulnerable and powerless human 
beings who are largely dependent on others and need, at least in some 
important aspects, special and more comprehensive protection than 
adults. That is a normal feature of being a child and per se not a form 
of illegitimate oppression, although some features of modern societies 
do oppress children and exploit their vulnerability and powerlessness. 
Evidence about the influences and negative effects of child poverty on 
many different functionings of children – on capabilities and func-
tionings in later life, too – shows that these children are inefficiently 
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protected. They are disadvantaged for the arbitrary reason that they 
were born poor. 
 In this conclusion, we wish to mention a few limitations of our exam-
ination and issues that need further attention. We have not explored 
the extent to which the limitation of family income is in itself unjust; 
rather, we were concerned with it as a corrosive disadvantage and with 
how it spreads and affects other important dimensions of life. This corro-
siveness goes well beyond the functionings we explored; for example, a 
recent study on poverty and material deprivation in the USA concluded 
that income poverty harms all different kinds of dimensions of well-
being of children. 
 Strikingly, children in low-income families are more likely to experi-
ence each of the remaining 16 deprivations (excluding low income) 
compared to children as a whole. In many cases, the deprivation inci-
dence for these children is twice as high or higher. The incidences 
of parental unemployment and financial stress are remarkably high 
at 48% and 56%, respectively. Low-income children are also much 
more likely to suffer from a poor physical environment and live in 
sub-standard housing conditions and in unsafe or polluted neighbor-
hoods. Of great concern, too, are much higher parental incidences 
of low education and poor health, with negative consequences in 
the labor market. Finally, more than one-third of children living in 
low-income families experience low social/emotional well-being, 
compared to the already-high incidence of one-quarter among all 
children. (Ciula and Skinner 2014, 14) 
 Our focus on ‘ordinary’ poverty also led us to exclude the most disad-
vantaged children from our examination, those who live on the street 
and are homeless, unattended minor refugees and asylum seekers, illegal 
immigrants and victims of prostitution and trafficking. These children 
are not part of large-scale national surveys and counting of the poor; 
there are only estimates of how many children in modern welfare states 
have to live under these conditions. The body of research concerned 
with the health, education and social inclusion of such disadvantaged 
and even more particular vulnerable groups of children shows that 
the effects are serious (for the case of immigrants and refugees, see: 
Ruiz-Casares et al. 2010; Fazel et al. 2012; Hodes 2000; for the case of 
homeless children, see Bassuk 2010; Fantuzzo et al. 2012). The offi-
cial survey in the USA counted more than 600,000 people living on 
the street on a given night in January 2013, of whom 23 percent, or 
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138,149, were children under the age of eighteen; 6,197 of these chil-
dren were unaccompanied (Meghan, Cortes and Morris 2013). Another 
report by the National Center on Family Homelessness found that about 
1.6 million (1 in 45 children) experienced homelessness over the course 
of 2010, an increase compared with previous years as a result of the 
economic downturn (National Center on Family Homelessness 2011). 
A report from 2007, which collected insights from various European 
countries, suggested that the problem is also a significant issue, but we 
were unable to locate any accurate estimation (European Observatory 
on Homelessness 2007). Street children in eastern European countries, 
like Romania, are of particular concern, as they face many threats to 
their well-being (UNICEF 2007). The lack of knowledge about children’s 
lives under such adverse circumstances is problematic in itself, and we 
fear that this ‘invisibility’ also delays efforts to help them and make 
justice for them a reality. We were also not able to do justice to the many 
issues discussed under the concept of intersectionality, which refers to 
the intersection of different forms of disadvantage, oppression and 
discrimination (Norris, Zajicek and Murphy-Erby 2010). Again, we find 
here very disturbing evidence of how modern welfare states fail children 
on multiple levels. Race, ethnicity, disability and gender all influence 
the likelihood of being poor, and they are also independent factors in 
regard to many functionings of well-being and well-becoming. From our 
social justice perspective, this can be evaluated as the intersection of the 
violation of different claims of justice of these children. Justice for chil-
dren as we conceptualize it means that children and adolescents must 
not be discriminated against but equally respected for being humans of 
equal worth, whatever their race, ethnicity, gender or sexual orienta-
tion. The fact that poverty is more common among such children is, as 
a result, a very severe form of discrimination and injustice and must be 
condemned as such. 
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